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I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual assault takes many forms, ranging from the stranger 
rape of an adult woman or abduction of a child to the repeated 
molestation of a child by an acquaintance, a family member, or a 
stranger who has met and groomed the child for assault.
But whatever its manifestation, sexual assault often does
extreme damage.  “[T]he sexual predator poses a danger that is 
unlike any other.”1  “Short of homicide, [rape] is the ‘ultimate 
violation of self.’ . . . Rape is very often accompanied by physical 
injury . . . and can also inflict mental and psychological damage.
Because it undermines the community’s sense of security, there is 
public injury as well.”2  Likewise, the effects of childhood sexual 
abuse are “frequently lifelong and severe.”3  Children who are 
sexually abused “will be damaged physically, emotionally, mentally, 
and spiritually.  Every aspect of their lives will be affected.  When 
they become adults . . . [m]any will become drug addicts.  Some 
will destroy themselves.”4
In recent years, an increasing number of states have employed 
civil commitment as one tool to help prevent repeated sexual 
assault.5  “Civil commitment”—the use of civil law processes to 
commit persons with mental disorders to treatment programs for 
their own protection or the protection of others—is well
established in both law and public policy.6  Minnesota has long 
used civil commitment to address the problems of persons with 
mental illness, mental retardation and chemical dependency;7
there is little dispute about the general appropriateness of such 
commitment.
For more than sixty years, Minnesota and other states have 
used civil commitment to address the problem of persons who 
1. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn. 1994).
2. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977).
3. MIC HUNTER, ABUSED BOYS: THE NEGLECTED VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 45 
(Lexington Books 1990).
4. Id. at ix.
5. Alan Held, The Civil Commitment of Sexual Predators—Experience Under 
Minnesota’s Law, in THE SEXUAL PREDATOR 2-4 to 2-5 (Anita Schlank & Fred Cohen 
eds., 1999).
6. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
7. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subds. 2, 13, 14 (2002).
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perpetrate sexual assault.8  The use of civil commitment for this 
purpose has ebbed and flowed, but has dramatically increased since 
1990.9  Despite its long history, the use of civil commitment for 
sexual predators remains controversial, both constitutionally and as 
a matter of policy.  Over the last dozen years, sexual predator 
commitment statutes have faced (and withstood) constant attack 
on constitutional grounds.  Legislatures have continued to
confront policy issues related to these commitments—the cost of 
both the commitment process and the treatment/confinement 
facilities to which such persons are committed as well as the relative 
roles of the civil and criminal processes in protecting the public 
from the ravages of sexual assault.
This article addresses these issues.  It summarizes the
development and implementation of Minnesota’s two laws used to 
civilly commit sexual predators.  It reviews the most significant 
judicial challenges to the use of these laws in Minnesota’s state and 
federal courts and the U.S. Supreme Court,10 and describes what 
issues seem to be well settled and those that remain unclear.  Lastly, 
it discusses the policy issues involved in the use of civil commitment 
for this purpose.
II. DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF SEXUAL PREDATOR COMMITMENT
LAWS IN MINNESOTA—A WHIRLWIND TRIP FROM 1939 TO 2003
A. The Psychopathic Personality Statute
In 1939, Minnesota became just the third state to adopt a 
sexual predator civil commitment law11 with the enactment of the 
“psychopathic personality” (“PP”) commitment statute.12  By 1970, 
8. PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV., OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, STATE OF
MINN., PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY COMMITMENT LAW 3 (1994) [hereinafter LEGIS.
AUD. REP.].
9. Id. at 11.
10. In written materials for a continuing legal education presentation, the 
author has provided a relatively comprehensive summary of Minnesota case law 
discussing the standards and procedures for commitment of persons under
Minnesota’s two commitment statutes for sexual predators. See John L. Kirwin, The
Commitment of Sexual Predators in Minnesota: Legal Overview, in Sexual Psychopathic
Personalities and Sexually Dangerous Persons (Minn. Inst. of Legal Educ. 2002) 
[hereinafter Kirwin, Overview].
11. Michigan and Illinois enacted such laws in 1937. LEGIS. AUD. REP., supra
note 8, at 3.
12. Act of April 21, 1959, ch. 369, 1939 Minn. Laws 712, 712-13; see LEGIS.
4
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twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia had adopted such 
statutes.13
Minnesota’s 1939 statute defined the term “psychopathic
personality” as:
the existence in any person of such conditions of
emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack 
of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to 
appreciate the consequences of his acts, or a combination 
of any such conditions, as to render such person
irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual
matters and thereby dangerous to other persons.14
However, responding to a constitutional vagueness challenge
the same year the statute was enacted, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court15 gave the statute what 
was later regarded as a “narrowing interpretation,”16 holding that 
the law applied only to
those persons who, by a habitual course of misconduct in 
sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack of power to 
control their sexual impulses and who, as a result, are 
likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or 
other evil on the object of their uncontrolled and
uncontrollable desire.17
B. Use of the Psychopathic Personality Law Until 1990
During the 1940s, 50s and 60s, the PP law was used frequently 
to commit persons to state hospitals, but its use declined following 
that period.  An average of seventy-four persons per decade were 
committed from 1939 to 1969.18  During the 1940s and 1950s, the 
AUD. REP., supra note 8, at 3.
13. LEGIS. AUD. REP., supra note 8, at 3.
14. Act of Apr. 21, 1939, ch. 369, § 1, 1939 Minn. Laws 712, 712-13.
15. 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
16. In re Linehan (Linehan I), 518 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1994) (stating 
Pearson “narrowed the reach of the statutory definition”).
17. Pearson, 205 Minn. at 555, 287 N.W.2d at 302.  This interpretation was 
narrower than the statutory language in at least two ways: it required that the 
person must have a past history of sexual misconduct and it required an utter lack 
of power to control harmful sexual behavior. Id.
18. LEGIS. AUD. REP., supra note 8, at 11.  The Legislative Auditor’s 1994 
report attributes these numbers of committed persons to staff of the Minnesota 
Security Hospital.  Another source had previously reported higher numbers of 
committed persons. LEGIS. AUD. REP., supra note 8, at 11. See Eric S. Janus & 
Nancy H. Walbek, Sex Offender Commitments in Minnesota: a Descriptive Study of Second 
Generation Commitments, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 343, 349 n.35 (2000).
5
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law was used primarily as an alternative to criminal punishment 
(i.e., persons were committed under the PP law rather than being 
criminally charged and convicted) and many persons were
committed for what would now be viewed as minor offenses.19  Most 
committed persons were first-time offenders.20  In the 1960s and 
later, committed persons were more violent and more likely to be 
repeat offenders.21
But commitments under the law then diminished dramatically.
Only thirteen persons were committed in the 1970s and just
fourteen in the 1980s.22
C. 1980—Minnesota Changes from “Indeterminate” Criminal 
Sentences to Determinate Sentences and Sentencing Guidelines
Before 1980, Minnesota employed a system of indeterminate 
criminal sentencing.23  Under this system, judges generally imposed 
lengthy sentences.24  However, the parole board established an 
offender’s actual time spent in prison and determined when an 
offender would be released on parole supervision.25  Under this 
system, parole boards released most prisoners after serving
relatively short terms—much less than the lengthy terms imposed 
by the sentencing judges.26  Offenders who were thought to be 
unduly dangerous could be detained in prison for longer periods, 
sometimes up to the maximum length of the sentence.27  But 
“serving until expiration” was the exception; for most offenders, 
release was based on a determination by the parole board that they 
could be released with reasonable safety.28
All of this changed in May 1980 when Minnesota moved to a 
system of fixed sentences determined according to sentencing 
guidelines.29  Under this system, the actual time the offender would 
19. LEGIS. AUD. REP., supra note 8, at 16.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 16.
22. Id. at 11.  During this period, most states actually repealed their sexual 
predator commitment laws. Id. at 4.
23. Stephen C. Rathke, Plea Negotiating Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 5 
HAMLINE L. REV. 271, 272 (1982).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 272-73.
26. Id. at 273.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 272-73.
29. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 273, art. 1, 1978 Minn. Laws 761, 762-70
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 244.01-.11 (2002)).
6
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spend in prison would be determined by the sentencing judge 
according to the guidelines.  An offender sent to prison would 
presumptively serve two-thirds of the pronounced sentence in 
prison and the remainder on supervised release; however, “good 
time” could be taken away for disciplinary infractions, so that the 
prison release date could be extended, usually for a short period.30
Thus, for offenses committed beginning in May 1980, offenders 
were released from prison, not based on a determination of their 
potential to reoffend, but because they had reached the supervised 
release dates on which they were entitled to be released.
D. Increased Use of Psychopathic Personality Law
Between 1987 and 1991, Minnesotans were horrified by a 
number of rape/murders committed by sex offenders recently 
released from state prisons.31  Responding to the earliest of these 
crimes, Attorney General Hubert Humphrey in 1988 convened a 
task force to address issues of sexual violence against women.32  The 
task force issued its Final Report in 1989, containing many
recommendations33 including both stiffer criminal sentences for 
dangerous sex offenders and, most significant here, increased use 
of PP commitment to confine and treat the most dangerous
offenders being released from prison.34
The 1989 Minnesota Legislature enacted several provisions to 
help assure that highly dangerous sex offenders would not be 
released prematurely.  In addition to enacting tougher criminal 
sentences,35 the Legislature required a court sentencing a sex 
30. MINN. STAT. § 244.04 (2002).
31. LEGIS. AUD. REP., supra note 8, at 7, 8; Marna J. Johnson, Comment, 
Minnesota’s Sexual Psychopathic Personality and Sexually Dangerous Person Statute:
Throwing Away the Key, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1139, 1148, 1150 (1996).
32. OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA ATTORNEY GENERAL, TASK FORCE ON THE
PREVENTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, FINAL REPORT 2 (1989)
[hereinafter ATT’Y GEN. REP.].
33. See discussion infra Part VII.
34. ATT’Y GEN. REP., supra note 32, at 10-14, 23.
35. A “patterned sex offender” sentencing option was adopted, allowing
longer sentences up to the statutory maximum for offenders evaluated and 
determined likely to reoffend.  Act of June 1, 1989, ch. 290, art. 4, § 10, 1989 
Minn. Laws 1580, 1620-21.  And the statutory maximum sentences were increased 
for first-through-fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. Id. §§ 12-15, 1989 Minn. 
Laws at 1622-23.  In addition, the Legislature enacted a thirty-seven year maximum 
sentence for certain third-time sex offenders. Id. art. 2, § 14, 1989 Minn. Laws at 
1593.
7
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offender to make a preliminary determination whether a PP
commitment may be appropriate and to refer any such cases to the 
county attorney.36
The event that had the greatest effect in increasing sexual 
predator commitments, however, was an administrative action by 
the State’s Commissioner of Corrections, Frank Wood.37  In 1990-
91, Minnesota reeled from three notorious rape/murders
committed by sex offenders just released from prison.38
Responding to these events, in 1991 Wood began a process to 
evaluate all high-risk sex offenders before release from prison and 
to refer selected persons to their county attorneys to be considered 
for PP commitment.39  The Legislature enacted this screening 
process into law the following year,40 and also adopted further 
enhancements to the criminal sentencing laws for sex offenders 
and offenders who had murdered with sexual intent or had a sex 
offense history.41
The result of the Department of Correction’s sex offender 
screening process was dramatic: PP commitments increased from 
two in 1990 to ten in 1991 and twenty-two in 1992.42  In contrast to 
early commitments under the PP law, most persons committed 
during the early 1990s were repeat sex offenders who either had 
failed or refused to participate in sex offender treatment in
prison.43  On average, they had spent almost seven years in prison 
immediately preceding their commitment.44
Minnesota’s increased use of civil commitment to address 
problems of sexual violence coincided with a similar movement 
around the country.  Washington, in 1990, had become the first 
36. See Act of June 1, 1989, ch. 290, art. 4, § 9, 1989 Minn. Laws 1580, 1619-20
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 609.1351 (2002)).
37. LEGIS. AUD. REP., supra note 8, at 13.
38. Id.  at 8; Johnson, supra note 31, at 1150.
39. LEGIS. AUD. REP., supra note 8, at 8; Johnson, supra note 31, at 1151 & 
n.71.
40. Act of Apr. 29, 1992, ch. 571, art. 3, § 3, 1992 Minn. Laws 1983, 2010 
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subd. 7 (2002)).
41. Act of Apr. 29, 1992, ch. 571, art. 1, §§ 13-14 and art. 4, § 4, 1992 Minn. 
Laws 1983, 1991-93, 2015-16.
42. LEGIS. AUD. REP., supra note 8, at 11.  The rate of commitments waned
somewhat, settling into the teens per year.  By July 1, 1998, there were about 134 
persons under commitment. MINN. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, CIVIL COMMITMENT
STUDY GROUP, 1998 REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 2 (1999) [hereinafter DOC CIV.
COMMIT. STUDY].
43. LEGIS. AUD. REP., supra note 8, at 16-17.
44. Id. at 17.
8
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state to adopt a modern, “second-generation,” sexual predator
commitment law.45  By 2001, at least seventeen states had adopted 
such laws.46  Unlike earlier laws that generally were used to commit 
people instead of imprisoning them, the new generation of
commitment laws is most often used following completion of a 
person’s prison term.47
E. 1994—Linehan I and Rickmyer and Deliberations Leading to 
Sexually Dangerous Person Law
As commitments under the PP law increased in the early 
1990s, committed persons began to challenge both the
constitutionality and the applicability of the law.  The constitutional 
challenges, all unsuccessful, are discussed in Part IV.  But three 
1994 judicial decisions interpreting the application of the law are 
particularly significant here, because they helped spur the
enactment of the “sexually dangerous person” law that year.
Responding to the constitutional challenges to the PP law and 
the public policy debate engendered by those challenges, the 1994 
Minnesota Legislature created a task force “to study issues relating
to the confinement of sexual predators, including commitment of 
psychopathic personalities.”48  Then, in June 1994, before the Task 
Force held its first meeting, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued 
decisions In re Linehan (Linehan I)49 and In re Rickmyer,50 overturning
45. Community Protection Act, ch. 3, §§ 1001-13, 1990 Wash. Laws 12, 97-102
(codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.010-.230 (2000)) ; LEGIS. AUD.
REP., supra note 8, at 37; Johnson, supra note 31, at 1172 n.229.
46. Ken Kozlowski, In the Wake of Hendricks—States Seem “Committed” to SVP 
Programs, in 2 THE SEXUAL PREDATOR 4-2 & n.5 (Anita Schlank ed. 2001).  The 
following states have modern sexual predator commitment laws: Arizona (ARIZ
REV. STAT. § 36-3701 (Supp. 2002)); California (CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-
6609.3 (West 1998)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.910 (West 2002)); Illinois 
(725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/1-207/99 (2002)); Iowa (IOWA CODE § 229A.1 (2000)); 
Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. 59-29a01 (1999)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.500 
(Michie 2000)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. §§ 253B.02, subd. 18(c), 253B.185
(2002)); Missouri (MO. REV. STAT. §§ 632.480-632.513 (2000)); New Jersey (N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24 to 30:4-27.38 (West Supp. 2002)); North Dakota (N.D.
CENT. CODE § 25-03.3 (2002)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-10 (Law. 
Co-op. 2002)); Texas (TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.081 (Vernon 2003 
Supp.)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-70.1 (2002 Supp.) (not effective until Jan. 
1, 2004)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09 (2002)); and Wisconson (WIS.
STAT. § 980.01 (1998)).
47. LEGIS. AUD. REP., supra note 8, at 37; Johnson, supra note 31, at 1172 
n.229.
48. Act of May 10, 1994, ch. 636, art. 8, § 20, 1994 Minn. Laws 2170, 2312-13.
49. 518 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1994).
9
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PP commitments.
Dennis Linehan was committed under the PP statute in 1992, 
shortly before his scheduled release from a prison term for the 
sexually motivated kidnap/murder of a fourteen-year-old
babysitter, Barbara Iverson, in 1965.  The issue addressed by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court was “whether the record supports, by 
clear and convincing evidence,” the trial court’s conclusion that 
Linehan met the Pearson requirement that he have an utter lack of 
power to control his sexual impulses.51  Reversing Linehan’s
commitment, the supreme court said the evidence “fail[ed] to 
support the trial court’s finding.”52
Although Linehan I is most narrowly characterized as a case 
involving sufficiency of the evidence, some of the court’s
statements raised concerns among county attorneys and policy 
makers as to the continued vitality and usefulness of the PP law.
Noting “a key distinction in the Pearson test—the difference
between uncontrolled desire and uncontrollable desire,” the court 
emphasized expert testimony that Linehan’s behavior leading up to 
the 1965 kidnap/murder was “planned” and “planful.”53 Linehan I
left it unclear whether the county attorney simply needed better 
testimony to commit someone like Linehan, or whether evidence 
of planning by a proposed patient would undercut a finding of 
“utter lack of power to control sexual impulses.”
The other decision, Rickmyer, concerned a pedophile.
Rickmyer had a history of molesting children, including exposing 
himself to young boys in a motel room, approaching children at a 
playground and touching their bare buttocks, touching the “private 
parts” of one boy a number of times, and repeatedly “spanking” 
children at a playground.54  Experts agreed, and the district court 
found, that Rickmyer was likely to continue to victimize children.55
The Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether
Rickmyer’s acts were sufficiently harmful to warrant commitment 
under the PP law.  The court held that physical harm was not 
required, but rather that “[t]here may be instances where a
pedophile’s pattern of sexual misconduct is of such an egregious 
50. 519 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1994).
51. Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 613.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 612.
54. Rickmyer, 519 N.W.2d at 189.
55. Id. at 189-90.
10
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nature that there is a substantial likelihood of serious physical or
mental harm being inflicted on the victims such as to meet the 
requirements for commitment.”56  However, the court held that 
Rickmyer’s “unauthorized sexual ‘touchings’ and ‘spankings’ while 
repellent, do not constitute the kind of injury, pain ‘or other evil’ 
that is contemplated by the psychopathic personality statute.”57
The court also held that “the record does not support the trial 
court’s findings” that Rickmyer inflicted serious physical or mental 
harm on his victims.58
Because the meetings of the Task Force began almost
immediately after the Linehan I and Rickmyer decisions, there was a 
great deal of concern regarding the effects of the two decisions.
Moreover, shortly after the Task Force began meeting, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals decided In re Schweninger,59 holding 
that a pedophile with a fifteen-year history of preying on numerous 
young boys, including bribing, fondling, exposure and oral sex, did 
not pose a sufficient level of harm to warrant commitment under 
the statute.60  The appellate court held that a pedophile could not 
be committed absent a showing of “violence.”61
The court in Schweninger also addressed the “utter-lack-of-
power-to-control” issue.62  Schweninger had engaged in “classic 
grooming” behavior63 with his victims.64  The appellate court held 
that Schweninger’s “plotting, planning” and “seduction” were
inconsistent with utter lack of power to control.65  The Schweninger
decision added to the Rickmyer/Linehan I confusion as to what 
56. Id. at 190 (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 520 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
60. Id. at 447-49.
61. Id. at 450.
62. Id. at 449-50.
63. “Grooming” consists of a set of behaviors commonly used by pedophiles 
to make the child available for sexual abuse. See In re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d 
525, 530 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).  For example, in In re Adolphson, No. C5-95-533,
1995 WL 434386 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), the pedophile “enticed the boys by first 
offering them jobs at his theater and furniture store, paying them in cash.  He 
socialized with them, inviting them to his apartment or lake home singly or in 
small groups. Once there, he supplied them with alcohol, cigarettes, and
pornography.” Id. at *1.  Pedophiles sometimes access children by befriending 
their parents. See, e.g., In re Ayers, 570 N.W.2d 21, 22 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); see
also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 571 (4th ed. text revision 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
64. Schweninger, 520 N.W.2d at 448.
65. Id. at 450.
11
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conduct would be harmful enough for a PP commitment, and 
whether any person could really have an utter lack of power to 
control sexual impulses.66
The Attorney General and several county attorneys told the 
Task Force that, with these interpretations, the appellate courts 
may have significantly decreased the usefulness of the PP statute to 
protect the public from sexual predators.67  After many meetings 
over the course of five weeks, the Task Force issued an Interim
Report proposing a set of statutory amendments relating to the civil 
commitment of sexual predators.68
F. Enactment of Sexually Dangerous Person Law
The Legislature met in a special session on August 31, 1994 
and enacted statutory amendments essentially as recommended by 
the Task Force.69  The new law added a  commitment category to 
Minnesota’s Civil Commitment Act, Minnesota Statutes
chapter 253B.  The new commitment category was for a “sexually 
dangerous person” or “SDP”:
Subd. 18c. Sexually dangerous person.  (a)  A “sexually 
dangerous person” means a person who:
(1)  has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct as 
defined in subdivision 7a;
(2)  has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental 
disorder or dysfunction; and
(3)  as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual 
conduct as defined in subdivision 7a.
(b)  For purposes of this provision, it is not necessary to 
prove that the person has an inability to control the
66. Another decision, issued a week after Schweninger by the same court of 
appeals panel, furthered this confusion. See Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1994). Bieganowski affirmed the commitment of a child molester and also 
called into question the meaning of the inability-to-control discussion in Linehan I.
See id. at 530-32.  The court in Bieganowski held that evidence of planning does not 
necessarily negate an inability to control sexual impulses, seemingly contradicting 
what it had said the previous week in Schweninger. Id. at 530.
67. John L. Kirwin, Civil Commitment of Sexual Predators: Statutory and Case Law 
Developments, HENNEPIN LAWYER, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 22, 24 [hereinafter Kirwin, 
Developments].
68. TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL PREDATORS, INTERIM REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA
LEGISLATURE 3 (Aug. 19, 1994).
69. See Act of Aug. 31, 1994, ch. 1, art.1, §§ 1-7, 1995 Minn. Laws 5, 6-9 (1994 
first special session).
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person’s sexual impulses.70
The term “harmful sexual conduct” used in the SDP definition 
is also defined in the statute:
Subd. 7a. Harmful sexual conduct.  (a)  “Harmful sexual 
conduct” means sexual conduct that creates a substantial 
likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to
another.
(b)  There is a rebuttable presumption that conduct 
described in the following provisions creates a substantial 
likelihood that a victim will suffer serious physical or
emotional harm: [provisions defining first-, second-,
third-, and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct].  If the 
conduct was motivated by the person’s sexual impulses or 
was part of a pattern of behavior that had criminal sexual 
conduct as a goal, the presumption also applies to
[provisions defining murder; manslaughter; first-, second-,
and third-degree assault; robbery; kidnapping; false
imprisonment; incest; witness tampering; first-degree
arson; first-degree burglary; terroristic threats; harassment 
and stalking].71
The new commitment category contained the same three basic 
elements as the Pearson standard, i.e., (1) history of harmful sexual 
conduct, (2) a mental dysfunction and (3) resulting likelihood of 
future harmful sexual conduct.72  However, because of the issues 
that arose regarding the PP law, the SDP commitment standard 
made two substantive changes.
First, in response to the Linehan I decision, the new statute 
defined the dysfunction differently than either the PP statute or 
Pearson.  The new law required the person to have a “mental 
disorder or dysfunction;” sexual and personality disorders were two 
types of mental disorders that may be included.73  The new statute 
made it clear that this definition of disorder, and not the inability-
to-control standard from Pearson, applied.74  The language of the 
SDP statute was drafted in consultation with mental health
professionals, and was written in contemporary language used by 
such persons, rather than the archaic language of the PP statute 
70. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (2002).
71. Id. subd. 7a.
72. See State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Ct. of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 
555, 287 N.W.2d 297, 302 (1939).
73. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(a)(2) (2002).
74. Id. at subd. 18c(b).
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and Pearson.75
The second significant change was in response to the Rickmyer
decision.  While the definition of “harmful sexual conduct” was 
taken essentially verbatim from Rickmyer, the new statute created a 
rebuttable presumption that conduct violating certain criminal 
statutes would be sufficiently harmful to support civil
commitment.76  This addressed the concern that the decisions in 
Rickmyer and Schweninger had not given sufficient weight to the 
serious long-term emotional harm caused to children by the acts of 
pedophiles who inflict their harm without force.77
In addition to enacting the new “SDP” commitment standard, 
the 1994 law also made minor, non-substantive changes regarding 
the PP statute.  It was renamed “sexual psychopathic personality” 
(or “SPP”) and was moved from the probate statutes to the Civil 
Commitment Act, Minnesota Statutes chapter 253B.78  Moreover, 
the Pearson construction, including the utter-lack-of-power-to-
control requirement, was incorporated into the SPP law.79  The 
1994 act expressly stated that these amendments were not intended 
to make any substantive change in the PP law.80
The SPP law was retained because it was certain that there 
would be a constitutional challenge to the new SDP law.  Even 
though the Legislature believed the new law would be upheld, it 
seemed prudent to keep the old law on the books and to commit 
persons under both statutes if possible.81  Since 1994, county 
attorneys have sought and obtained commitments under both laws 
in most cases.82
G. Key Interpretations of SDP Law—Likelihood of Reoffense and 
Inability to Control
Because almost every committed person appeals his
75. In re Linehan (Linehan III), 557 N.W.2d 171, 185 (Minn. 1996), vacated 
and remanded, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997), aff’d as modified, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 
1999); Kirwin, Developments, supra note 67, at 24.
76. See MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 7a (2002).
77. Kirwin, Developments, supra note 67, at 24-25.
78. Act of Aug. 31, 1994, ch. 1, art.1, §§ 2, 4-6, 1995 Minn. Laws 5, 6-9 (1994 
first special session).
79. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18b (2002).
80. Act of Aug. 31, 1994, ch. 1, art. I, § 5, 1995 Minn. Laws 5, 8 (1994 first 
special session).
81. Kirwin, Developments, supra note 67, at 25.
82. Janus & Walbek, supra note 18, at 354.
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commitment, the courts have made many interpretations of the 
SDP law since its enactment in 1994.83  Two interpretations, 
however, stand out as most important.
1. Highly Likely to Reoffend
The first of these relates to the language of the SDP law 
requiring the court to find that the person is “likely” to engage in 
additional harmful sexual conduct as a result of his mental
disorder.84  When Dennis Linehan was committed under the SDP 
law soon after its enactment, the trial court interpreted the term 
“likely” to mean “highly likely.”85  On appeal, the Minnesota
Supreme Court agreed.86  The court asserted that a “highly likely” 
probability of reoffense is required in order to be consistent with 
the clear-and-convincing standard of proof in commitment cases.87
In addition, the court said, “[t]he due process clauses of both the 
federal and state constitutions require that future harmful sexual 
conduct must be highly likely in order to commit a proposed 
patient under the SDP Act.”88  While the court did not specifically 
quantify “highly likely,” it is clear from the court’s discussion that it 
is a higher standard than “more probable than not,” or fifty-one
percent.
The court’s reasoning in adopting the highly likely standard is 
questionable.  First, commentators generally recognize that risk
probability and standard of proof are distinct concepts.89  Thus, a 
low risk probability (i.e., risk of a future event occurring) can be 
proven by a high standard of proof, and vice versa.90  There is no 
83. See Kirwin, Overview, supra note 10, at 13-34, 55-64 (describing the
interpretations in detail).
84. See MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(a)(3) (2002).
85. Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d 171, 176 (Minn. 1996), vacated and remanded, 522 
U.S. 1011 (1997), aff’d as modified, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999).
86. Id. at 180.
87. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 1 (2002) (requiring a clear and convincing 
standard of proof in SDP cases); Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 180.
88. Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 180.
89. Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Is It Unethical to Offer Predictions of 
Future Violence?, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 626-27 n.7 (1992); John Monahan & 
David Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil Commitment, 2 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 37, 38-42 (1978). See generally, Eric S. Janus, The Use of Social Science 
and Medicine in Sex Offender Commitment, 23 CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 347, 381 
(1997).
90. People v. Superior Court (Ghillotti), 44 P.3d 949, 974 n.15 (Cal. 2002) 
(“[I]t is not incongruous to require a unanimous jury to be convinced beyond 
reasonable doubt that one . . . presents a serious and well-founded risk [a standard 
15
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logical reason that the required risk level under the SDP law must, 
or even should, parallel the clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard.
Second, there is no reason that substantive due process
requires a high likelihood—i.e., a standard that is higher than a 
more-probable-than-not standard—to support civil commitment.
The “danger” posed by the proposed patient, and therefore the 
weight of the public interest in his civil commitment, has several 
components, often expressed as the magnitude of the expected 
harm, the probability of it occurring, how frequently it will occur 
and, perhaps, how imminently it will occur.91  Under the SDP law, 
the gravity of the harm is, by definition, great; the anticipated 
conduct must be so egregious that it creates a substantial likelihood 
of serious physical or emotional harm.92 Where such harm is 
anticipated, the state’s interest is compelling and outweighs the 
individual’s interest, even where the likelihood of the person 
engaging in the conduct is “only” fifty-one percent.  Dennis 
Linehan and Clark Bailey, for example, each killed an adolescent 
girl in the course of a sexual assault.93  Richard Enebak, who had at 
least thirty-seven sexual assault victims, permanently paralyzed his 
last victim and left her lying in a field.94  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s decision in Linehan III holds that the State would not have a 
sufficiently strong interest to civilly commit such persons if the 
likelihood that they would repeat such conduct is “merely” fifty-one
percent.95
Moreover, it seems implausible that the Minnesota court
would impose a “highly likely” standard for other types of
commitments, even though the “clear and convincing” proof
standard applies to all of the commitment categories.96  Under the 
less than 50%] of committing new acts of criminal sexual violence.”).
91. Marie A. Bochnewich, Comment, Prediction of Dangerousness and
Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Statute, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 277, 298 (1992); see
also Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (stating that
dangerousness involves consideration of both likelihood and gravity); William D. 
Andrews, Note, Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 
HARV. L. R. 1190, 1236, 1238 (1974) (same).
92. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 7a (2002).
93. In re Linehan (Linehan I), 518 N.W.2d 609, 610-11 (Minn. 1994); Bailey v. 
Noot, 324 N.W.2d 164, 165 (Minn. 1982).
94. Enebak v. Noot, 353 N.W.2d 544, 545-46 (Minn. 1984).
95. 557 N.W.2d 171, 182 (Minn 1996), vacated and remanded, 522 U.S. 1011 
(1997), aff’d as modified, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999).
96. MINN. STAT. § 253B.09, subd. 1 (2002) (providing the proof standard for 
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“mentally ill” commitment category,97 for example, would the court 
hold that a person who posed a risk of suicide due to her mental 
illness could not constitutionally be committed for safekeeping and 
treatment if the probability of suicide were “only” fifty-one percent?
Under the “mentally ill and dangerous to the public” commitment 
category,98 would the court hold that a person who had murdered 
due to her mental illness could not constitutionally be committed 
for treatment if the probability of homicide were “only” fifty-one
percent?  Stated slightly differently, would the court hold that a 
group of mentally ill persons was not sufficiently dangerous to be 
committed even if more than half of the persons would kill themselves or 
others if not committed?
While the Minnesota Supreme Court is not alone in requiring 
a high likelihood of reoffense for sexual predator commitments,99
other courts have rejected such an interpretation and have found 
the Minnesota court’s reasoning faulty.  In 2002, the California and 
Massachusetts Supreme Courts interpreted the word “likely” in 
their Sexually Violent Predator civil commitment statutes to not 
require a likelihood of even fifty percent.100  In this context, the 
California court defined “likely” to mean that “the person presents 
a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk, that he or 
she will commit such crimes if free in the community.”101  The court 
rejected the argument that substantive due process requires a 
“more likely than not to reoffend” standard, much less a higher 
standard.102
mentally ill, mentally retarded, and chemically dependent commitments); MINN.
STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 1 (providing the proof standard for mentally ill and
dangerous, SPP and SDP commitments).
97. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 13 (2002).
98. Id. subd. 17.
99. In In re W.Z., 801 A.2d 205, 217 (N.J. 2002), the New Jersey Supreme 
Court read the statutory term “likely” to mean “highly likely,” in order to
implement the “serious difficulty in controlling” discussion in Kansas v. Crane, 534 
U.S. 407, 413 (2002).  In In re Leon G., 59 P.3d 779, 786-87 (Ariz. 2002), the 
Arizona Supreme Court interpreted the term “likely” to mean “highly probable” 
based on other language peculiar to the Arizona statute.  The Arizona court 
observed that interpreting the term to mean merely “probable” would not raise 
constitutional concerns. Id. at 786.
100. See People v. Superior Court (Ghillotti), 44 P.3d 949, 973 (Cal. 2002); 
Commonwealth v. Boucher, 780 N.E.2d 47, 47 (Mass. 2002).  In addition, the 
Florida Supreme Court in Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 105-06 (Fla. 2002), 
affirmed the interpretation of the term “likely” as meaning “having a better
chance of occurring than not.”
101. Ghillotti, 44 P.3d at 972 (emphasis in original).
102. Id. at 973.
17
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The Massachusetts high court likewise rejected the argument 
that “likely” must mean “more likely than not,” explaining that
it is for the fact finder to determine what is “likely.”  Such 
a determination must be made on a case-by-case basis, by 
analyzing a number of factors, including the seriousness 
of the threatened harm, the relative certainty of the 
anticipated harm, and the possibility of successful
intervention to prevent that harm.103
“[B]y its plain meaning,” the Massachusetts court said, “likely” 
is a term that “demands contextual, not statistical, analysis.”104
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s “highly likely” requirement 
for SDP commitments appears to result from the court’s general 
belief that standards for sexual predator commitments, as opposed 
to other types of commitments, must be very high.  Nevertheless, 
no sound constitutional analysis supports this distinction.
2. Requirement of Inability to Adequately Control
The other significant judicial interpretation of the SDP law 
concerns the need to prove inability to control.  While the Pearson
standard applicable to the SPP law requires a showing of “utter lack 
of power to control sexual impulses,” the SDP law specifically states 
that “it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to 
control the person’s sexual impulses.”105  However, as discussed 
more fully below, in Linehan IV the Minnesota Supreme Court 
interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kansas v.
Hendricks106 to require that, to civilly commit a person as sexually 
dangerous, a state must prove an intermediate level of inability to 
control behavior.107  The state court therefore gave the SDP law a 
narrowing interpretation, holding that:
the provision in subdivision 18c (b), stating that “it is not 
necessary to prove that the person has an inability to 
control the person’s sexual impulses,” should be read very 
narrowly . . . to mean only that the state does not need to 
prove that a person meets the Pearson utter inability 
103. Boucher, 780 N.E.2d at 49-50 (citation omitted).
104. Id. at 50 (footnote omitted).
105. Compare MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18b (2002), with MINN. STAT. §
253B.02, subd. 18c(b) (2002).
106. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
107. In re Linehan (Linehan IV), 594 N.W.2d 867, 876 (Minn. 1999).
18
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standard.108
The court then said:
We now clarify that the SDP Act allows civil commitment 
of sexually dangerous persons who have engaged in a 
prior course of sexually harmful behavior and whose
present disorder or dysfunction does not allow them to 
adequately control their sexual impulses, making it highly 
likely that they will engage in harmful sexual acts in the 
future.109
III. COMMITMENT PROCEDURES
The procedures used in SPP and SDP commitment cases are 
the same as those applied to persons who are alleged or found to 
be “mentally ill and dangerous” (“MI&D”).110  The standards and 
procedures for commitment and discharge of persons committed 
under these three “highly dangerous to others” commitment
categories provide greater public protection than the standards 
and procedures that apply to the “regular” commitment categories 
of “mentally ill,” “mentally retarded” and “chemically dependent” 
persons.111
In an SPP/SDP case, the county attorney must determine 
whether good cause exists to file a commitment petition in the 
district court.112  In order to make this decision, the county attorney 
may move for a court order to obtain pre-petition access to a wide 
variety of records regarding the person who may be committed.113
108. Id. at 875.
109. Id. at 876 (emphasis added).
110. MINN. STAT. § 253B.185, subd. 1 (2002) (establishing the applicability of 
the same procedures); MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 17 (2002) (defining an MI&D 
person as one who is mentally ill and “has engaged in an overt act causing or 
attempting to cause serious physical harm to another”).
111. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subds. 2, 13, 14 (2002) (defining “chemically
dependent person,” “person who is mentally ill,” and “mentally retarded person”); 
MINN. STAT. §§ 253B.07-.09, 253B.12-.14, 253B.15-.16 (2002) (setting forth
commitment procedures); Lidberg v. Steffen, 514 N.W.2d 779, 784 (Minn. 1994); 
In re K.B.C., 308 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Minn. 1981).  While each of these categories 
requires a showing of danger to self or others, the SPP, SDP and MI&D categories 
are distinguished by the requirement that the court find the person to present a 
danger of conduct seriously harmful to other persons.
112. MINN. STAT. § 253B.185, subd. 1 (2002).
113. Id. subd. 1b.  The constitutionality of the provision allowing issuance of 
an order for pre-petition access to the person’s relevant records was upheld in In re 
Bartholomay, No. P8-00-554, 2001 WL 1645818, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 
2001).
19
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After a petition is filed and if the person will be released from 
prison before the final commitment decision can be issued, the 
petitioner may move the court for an interim order to hold the 
person in a treatment facility.114
The court appoints an attorney for the proposed patient.115
The court also appoints an “examiner”—a psychiatrist or doctoral-
degree psychologist—to examine the proposed patient and report 
to the court.116  Upon request, the court must appoint a second 
examiner selected by the proposed patient.117
The commitment trial is before a judge, without a jury.118  The 
privilege against self-incrimination does not generally apply to 
these proceedings, so the county attorney may call the proposed 
patient to testify.119
Following the trial, the court must determine by clear and 
convincing evidence whether the person meets the requirements 
for commitment.120  If so, the court must commit the patient to a 
“secure treatment facility” (the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, 
or “MSOP”), unless the proposed patient “establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence that a less restrictive treatment program is 
available that is consistent with the patient’s treatment needs and 
the requirements of public safety.”121
The court’s commitment following trial is an “initial”
commitment.122  The program to which the person is committed 
must then evaluate the patient and file a report within sixty days 
following the initial commitment order.123  After receiving the 
114. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07, subds. 2b, 7 (2002).
115. Id. subd. 2c.
116. Id. subd. 3 (requiring the appointment of an examiner); MINN. STAT.
§ 253B.02, subd. 7 (2002) (defining the qualifications of an examiner).
117. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07, subd. 3 (2002).
118. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 1 (2002).
119. See In re Woodruff, No. P7-97-60079, 1998 WL 345478, at *2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. June 30, 1998); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1986).
120. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 1 (2002).
121. MINN. STAT. § 253B.185, subd. 1 (2002) (requiring commitment to secure 
treatment facility); MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18a (2002) (defining “secure
treatment facility” as either the Minnesota Security Hospital or Minnesota Sexual
Psychopathic Personality Treatment Center).  In practice, persons committed as 
SPP and/or SDP are committed to MSOP, rather than the Security Hospital.
122. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subds. 1, 2 (2002).
123. Id. subd. 2.  Among other things, the report must address whether the 
patient’s condition has changed since the initial commitment, whether treatment 
facility staff believe the patient meets the commitment requirements and what 
program or facility can best meet the patient’s treatment and security
requirements.  Minn. Commit. & Treatment Act, MINN. STAT. § 253B, app. B, Rule 
20
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report, the court must hold a “review hearing” to determine 
whether the commitment will be continued for an indeterminate 
period.124
A person committed as SPP or SDP is entitled to all of the 
rights of other committed persons under the “Rights of Patients” 
section of the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act.125
Importantly, this includes “the right to receive proper care and 
treatment, best adapted, according to contemporary professional 
standards, to rendering further supervision unnecessary.”126
Once the person is indeterminately committed, the
committing court lacks the authority to terminate the
commitment.127  Rather, the commitment law provides a special 
procedure for granting full or partial release to any person
committed as SPP, SDP or MI&D.128  Whenever either the patient 
or the treatment facility seeks to have the patient discharged, 
provisionally discharged or transferred out of MSOP, the applicant 
must petition a three-member “special review board,” which then 
holds a hearing on the petition.129  The requested relief can be 
granted only with the concurrence of the special review board and 
the Commissioner of Human Services.130  Following the
Commissioner’s decision, either the patient or the county attorney 
may petition a specially appointed three-judge district court panel 
to conduct a de novo hearing and render a decision that supercedes 
the Commissioner’s decision.131  The Minnesota Supreme Court has 
described the graduated release process—transfer to a less-secure
facility, provisional discharge, and ultimately discharge—as an 
important part of the overall commitment process, allowing the 
patient to demonstrate that he has gained sufficient control over 
his sexual behavior to be released into the public with reasonable 
safety.132
The statutory standards for transfer and provisional discharge 
need not be repeated here.133  The standard for discharge, however, 
23(d) (2002).
124. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subds. 2, 3 (2002).
125. MINN. STAT. § 253B.03 (2002).
126. Id. subd. 7.
127. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 3 (2002).
128. See id. subds. 4b-15.
129. Id. subd. 5.
130. Id. subds. 6, 7, 15.
131. MINN. STAT. § 253B.19, subds. 1-3 (2002).
132. See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 1994).
133. See MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subds. 6, 7 (2002) (enumerating the standards 
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merits some discussion.  The statutory discharge provision states 
that the patient may not be discharged unless the Commissioner 
and special review board determine “that the patient [1] is capable 
of making an acceptable adjustment to open society, [2] is no 
longer dangerous to the public, and [3] is no longer in need of in-
patient treatment and supervision.”134  This provision, by its terms, 
indicates that a person committed as MI&D, SPP or SDP may not 
be discharged so long as any of the three facts continues to be true; 
for example, a person committed as MI&D could not be discharged 
if he continued to be dangerous or was unable to make an
acceptable adjustment to open society, even if he no longer had the 
mental disorder that supported the commitment.135  However, in 
1988 in Reome v. Levine,136 the federal district court held that the 
statute could not constitutionally be applied in that manner, and 
that a person committed as MI&D was entitled to discharge when it 
was shown that he was no longer mentally ill (Reome probably 
never had been137), even though he remained dangerous to the 
public.138  The U.S. Supreme Court later made essentially the same 
holding in Foucha v. Louisiana.139
Following Reome and Foucha, in Call v. Gomez,140 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court clarified the SPP/SDP discharge standard in two 
ways.  First, the court adopted the holding of Foucha, stating that:
the statutory discharge criteria [must be] applied in such 
a way that the person subject to commitment as a
psychopathic personality is confined for only so long as he 
or she continues both to need further inpatient treatment 
and supervision for his sexual disorder and to pose a 
danger to the public . . . .141
Thus, the court made it clear that the patient could not continue to 
for transfer and provisional discharge, respectively).
134. Id. subd. 15 (2002) (numbering and emphasis added).
135. Indeed, the Minnesota Court of Appeals so held in Reome v. Levine, 363 
N.W.2d 107, 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), appeal after remand, 379 N.W.2d 208 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985), stating that a person committed as MI&D could not be 
discharged so long as he continued to be dangerous, irrespective of whether he 
continued to be mentally ill. See also Enebak v. Noot, 353 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Minn. 
1984) (making same holding under provisional discharge provision).
136. 692 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Minn. 1988).
137. Id. at 1052.
138. Id. at 1051.
139. 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992).
140. 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995).
141. Id. (emphasis added).
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be held based simply on continued dangerousness, but that the 
dangerousness and the underlying disorder must both persist.  In 
addition, without discussion, the court omitted the “capable of 
making an acceptable adjustment to open society” requirement, 
apparently assuming it was included within the danger-to-the-public
requirement.
Second, the court held that the disorder need not persist at 
the level required for commitment in order for the commitment to 
continue, or, stated conversely, that the patient is not entitled to be 
discharged the minute the disorder improves so that it falls just 
below the severity required for commitment.  The court said:
In applying the discharge criteria, we note that a slight 
change or improvement in the person’s condition is not 
sufficient to justify discharge.  Moreover, . . . it is also not 
sufficient that the person no longer evinces the utter lack 
of control over his sexual impulses.  The utter lack of 
control over one’s sexual impulses is part of the threshold 
showing that must be met to justify commitment.
Confinement may continue without meeting this
threshold if the confinement still bears the reasonable 
relation to the original reason for commitment; that is, 
the person continues to need treatment for his sexual 
disorder and continues to pose a danger to the public,
which are the reasons for which the person was originally 
committed as a psychopathic personality.  We do not 
believe that a person who is one step below an utter lack 
of control over his sexual impulses is necessarily in
“remission” of his or her sexual disorder, such that his or 
her “deviant sexual assaultive conduct is brought under 
control.”142
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Minnesota’s two commitment laws have been challenged
repeatedly on constitutional grounds, when first enacted and again 
in recent years.  In addition, of course, decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court affect the constitutionality of these statutes.
A. 1939-40—Pearson
The first of these cases was State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court.143
142. Id. (citation omitted).
143. 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
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Pearson sought a writ to prohibit the PP proceeding against him.144
He challenged the law on four grounds: (1) that placing PP 
commitment matters under the jurisdiction of the probate court 
exceeded the constitutional jurisdiction of that court; (2) that the 
act adopting the PP law violated the state constitutional
requirement that the subject of a law be expressed in its title; 
(3) that the law was unconstitutionally vague; and (4) that the law 
violated Pearson’s right to a jury trial and other procedural rights 
not specified in the opinion.145  Just two months after the law’s 
enactment, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued its opinion
rejecting each of these claims.
The court’s most notable holding addressed the vagueness 
claim.  The court asked: “Is the act so indefinite and uncertain as to 
make it void?  Conceding that it is imperfectly drawn, the statute is 
nevertheless valid if it contains a competent and official expression 
of the legislative will.”146  After describing a number of principles of 
statutory construction, the court, in rather casual fashion, set forth 
what has been regarded as the Pearson narrowing interpretation:
Applying these principles to the case before us, it can 
reasonably be said that the language of Section 1 of the 
act is intended to include those persons who, by a habitual 
course of misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced 
an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses and 
who, as a result, are likely to attack or otherwise inflict 
injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their 
uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire.  It would not be 
reasonable to apply the provisions of the statute to every 
person guilty of sexual misconduct nor even to persons 
having strong sexual propensities.  Such a definition
would not only make the act impracticable of
enforcement and, perhaps, unconstitutional in its
application, but would also be an unwarranted departure 
from the accepted meaning of the words defined.147
Significantly, the court never directly stated how it answered its 
own question: “Is the act so indefinite and uncertain as to make it 
void?”  Nor did the court say that it was intending to adopt a 
“narrowing interpretation,” rather than simply explaining why the 
144. Id. at 546, 287 N.W. at 298.
145. Id. at 547, 556, 287 N.W. at 298-99, 303.
146. Id. at 554, 287 N.W. at 302 (citation omitted).
147. Id. at 555-56, 287 N.W. at 302-03 (citing Draper, Mental Abnormality in 
Relation to Crime, in 2 AM. JUR. MED. J., No. 3, p. 163).
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statute was not unduly vague.
The Minnesota court’s answer to the final question was clearer:
The final argument of the relator is that the act denies a 
“patient” a jury trial and fails to secure certain other rights 
of defendants in criminal proceedings.  Since the
proceedings here in question are not of a criminal
character, we will confine ourselves to consideration of 
relator’s right to a jury trial.148
Thus, the court expressly determined that criminal procedures 
were not required.  The court’s subsequent discussion concluded, 
apparently under the state constitution, that a jury trial was not 
constitutionally required.149
Pearson then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,150
contending that the statute violated his due process and equal 
protection rights.151  Addressing the vagueness aspect of the due 
process claim, the high Court accepted the state Attorney General’s 
assurance that the state court’s interpretation of the statute quoted 
above was, literally, the definitive reading of the statute: “This 
construction is binding upon us. . . .  For the purpose of deciding 
the constitutional questions appellant raises we must take the 
statute as though it read precisely as the highest court of the State 
has interpreted it.”152  The Court then held: “This construction of 
the statute destroys the contention that it is too vague and
indefinite to constitute valid legislation.”153  Referring to the
Minnesota court’s interpreting language, the high Court said: 
“These underlying conditions, calling for evidence of past conduct 
pointing to probable consequences, are as susceptible of proof as 
many of the criteria constantly applied in prosecutions for
crime.”154
The Supreme Court also addressed Pearson’s equal protection 
claim—that the state Legislature could not constitutionally select 
the defined class for special treatment (i.e., commitment).155
148. Id. at 556, 287 N.W. at 303.
149. Id. at 557, 287 N.W. at 303.
150. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
151. Id. at 272.  Even though the Minnesota court decision made no reference 
to an equal protection claim, the United States Supreme Court indicated that the 
claim was raised in the state court. See id.
152. Id. at 273 (citations omitted).
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Rejecting this claim, the Court said:
The class it did select is identified by the state court in 
terms which clearly show that the persons within that class 
constitute a dangerous element in the community which 
the legislature in its discretion could put under
appropriate control.  As we have often said, the legislature 
is free to recognize degrees of harm, and it may confine 
its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is 
deemed to be clearest.156
Pearson also raised a due process challenge to the
commitment procedures under the state law, but the Supreme 
Court rejected that claim as premature.157
One of the most curious aspects of the Pearson litigation is that 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s mere discussion of the meaning of 
the PP statute, addressing the claim that the statutory language was 
vague, became the operating definition.  There is no indication 
that the court chose its language so carefully or intended the 
melodramatic verbiage—“utter lack of power to control,”158 “injury, 
loss, pain or other evil,”159 and “objects of their uncontrolled and 
uncontrollable desire”160—to become the actual definition to be 
applied in commitment cases for years to come.
B. 1994—Blodgett
After PP commitments increased beginning in 1991, several 
persons challenged the constitutionality of the PP law in their 
commitment cases.  The first of these cases to reach the appellate 
courts was In re Blodgett.161  In the court of appeals, Blodgett 
challenged the PP statute based on vagueness, double jeopardy, 
substantive due process and equal protection grounds, and claimed 
that his commitment violated the terms of his prior criminal plea 
bargain.162  The court rejected all of these claims.163
156. Id. at 275.
157. Id. at 275-77.
158. See id. at 274.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. 490 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), aff’d, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 849 (1994).  In addition, in Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 
F.2d 1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 1991), the Eighth Circuit perfunctorily rejected a
committed person’s due process and equal protection challenges to his PP
commitment.
162. Blodgett, 490 N.W.2d at 645-47.
163. Id.
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss4/13
KIRWIN_FORMATTED 3/27/2003 11:47 PM
2003] ONE ARROW IN THE QUIVER 1161
At Blodgett’s request, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted 
review of the substantive due process and equal protection claims 
only.164  In a 4-3 decision, the court upheld the constitutionality of 
the statute.165
Justice Simonett wrote the majority opinion.  Considering 
Blodgett’s due process argument, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that the statute served a compelling government interest—
protecting the public from persons who have an uncontrollable 
impulse to sexually assault.166  The Blodgett court rejected the 
argument that the PP statute was inconsistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Foucha v. Louisiana.167  The court 
concluded that Foucha did not hold that typical mental illness is the 
only mental disorder that may support civil commitment.168  The 
court stated that the disorder identified in the PP statute and 
Pearson “is an identifiable and documentable violent sexually
deviant condition or disorder.”169  Likewise, the court rejected 
Blodgett’s assertion that the ability to assess risk of sexual reoffense 
is insufficient to justify commitment.170
The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged disagreement 
among treatment professionals about whether the mental disorders 
exhibited by persons committed as PP are treatable, but noted that 
there are many treatment programs for persons whose mental 
disorders render them sexually dangerous.171  The court observed 
that “even when treatment is problematic, and it often is, the state’s 
interest in the safety of others is no less legitimate and compelling.
164. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Minn. 1994).  Blodgett did not raise 
the vagueness argument in his appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court.  This 
argument obviously faced an uphill battle because the PP commitment standard 
from Pearson was a standard announced by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
response to a vagueness challenge, and then upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
response to such a challenge. See State ex. rel. Pearson v. Probate Court,  205 Minn. 
548, 554-55, 287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).  Blodgett was 
left in the uncomfortable position of arguing that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
own standard was unconstitutionally vague. Blodgett, 490 N.W.2d at 646.  The 
appellate court easily rejected this challenge. Id.  Notably, the appellate court 
emphasized that it applied the vagueness standard used to judge civil measures, 
rather than the stricter standard applied to criminal enactments. Id.
165. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 910.
166. Id. at 914.
167. Id. at 914-15 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78-79 (1992)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 915.
170. Id. at 917 n.15.
171. Id. at 916 n.12.
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So long as civil commitment is programmed to provide treatment
and periodic review, due process is provided.”172
Applying intermediate scrutiny analysis, the court also rejected 
Blodgett’s equal protection claim, which the court described as 
merely a variation of his substantive due process claim.173  The court 
observed that “the sexual predator poses a danger that is unlike any 
other,” and that the law “delineates genuine and substantial
distinctions which define a class that victimizes women and
children in a particular manner.”174
The court acknowledged that there are other approaches to 
dealing with mentally disordered sexual predators.175  Such persons 
may constitutionally be given long or indeterminate criminal
sentences, instead of civil commitments.176  However, the court 
concluded, “where there are no definitive answers, it would seem a 
state legislature should be allowed, constitutionally, to choose
either or both alternatives for dealing with the sexual predator.”177
Three justices, led by Justice Wahl, dissented.178  They asserted 
that civil commitment of sexual predators amounts to a “system of 
wholesale preventive detention, a concept foreign to our
jurisprudence.”179
The United States Supreme Court denied Blodgett’s petition 
for certiorari review.180
C. 1995—Call
Although Blodgett had raised a double jeopardy claim in the
state court of appeals, he did not raise this claim before the 
Minnesota Supreme Court.  The year after Blodgett, however, the 
state high court rejected a double jeopardy claim to a PP
commitment in Call v. Gomez, saying: “[O]ur decision in Blodgett
clearly establishes that commitment under the psychopathic
personality statute is remedial and does not constitute double 
jeopardy because it is for treatment purposes and is not for
172. Id. at 916.




177. Id. at 918.
178. Id. (Wahl, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. 513 U.S. 849 (1994).
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss4/13
KIRWIN_FORMATTED 3/27/2003 11:47 PM
2003] ONE ARROW IN THE QUIVER 1163
purposes of preventive detention.”181
D. 1996—Linehan III
A few months after Blodgett was decided, the Minnesota
Legislature adopted the SDP law in response to several
interpretations of the PP law, including Linehan I.182  Linehan’s PP 
commitment was overturned by the Minnesota Supreme Court, 
which held that utter lack of power to control had not been 
sufficiently proved.183  After the passage of the SDP law, the Ramsey 
County Attorney promptly petitioned to commit Linehan under 
the new law.184  Linehan, in turn, challenged the constitutionality of 
the new law on numerous grounds.185
The district court rejected Linehan’s claims that the SDP law 
was unconstitutional and found that he met the commitment 
criteria.186  The Minnesota Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed 
the decision.187  The Minnesota Supreme Court then granted 
review and, in its 1996 Linehan III decision, upheld the
constitutionality of the statute and Linehan’s commitment by a 4-2
margin.188
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Keith first addressed 
Linehan’s several substantive due process arguments.  The Linehan
III court rejected Linehan’s argument that the utter-lack-of-power-
to-control standard of the SPP law is constitutionally required for 
commitment.189  It held that the mental disorder element of the 
SDP law is even more narrowly tailored to serve the State’s
“compelling interest in protecting the public from sexual assault”190
181. 535 N.W.2d 312, 319-20 (Minn. 1995).
182. See supra Part II.E.
183. In re Linehan (Linehan I), 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994).
184. In re Linehan (Linehan III), 557 N.W.2d 171, 175-76 (Minn. 1996), vacated
and remanded, 522 U.S.1011 (1997), aff’d as modified, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999).
185. Id. at 176.
186. Id. at 176-77.
187. In re Linehan (Linehan III), 544 N.W.2d 308, 319 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), 
aff’d, 557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996), vacated and remanded, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997), 
aff’d as modified, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999).
188. Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d 171, 191 (Minn. 1996).  The careful reader will 
ask what happened to Linehan II.  In In re Linehan (Linehan II), 557 N.W.2d 167 
(Minn. 1996), vacated and remanded, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997), aff’d as modified, 594 
N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999), the Minnesota Supreme Court considered Linehan’s
appeal of the order making his initial commitment indeterminate under
Minnesota Statute section 253B.18, subdivision 3 (1994).
189. Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 183.
190. Id. at 181.
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than the utter-lack-of-power-to-control standard: “[T]he SDP Act is 
an attempt to protect the public by treating sexual predators even 
more dangerous than those reached by the PP Act—the mentally 
disordered who retain enough control to ‘plan, wait, and delay the 
indulgence of their maladies until presented with a higher
probability of success.’”191
The Linehan III court also rejected Linehan’s reason for
contending that utter lack of power to control is constitutionally
required: Linehan had argued that the utter-lack-of-
power-to-control element was necessary to identify persons who 
lack criminal responsibility, and are therefore “unreachable” by the 
criminal law.192  He asserted that a public-protection commitment
may be used only for persons who cannot be criminally punished 
for their acts.193  Nevertheless, the court noted that this argument 
was expressly rejected in Pearson, the case that first articulated the 
utter-lack-of-power-to-control standard.194  The court also observed 
that Linehan’s criminal responsibility justification was precluded by 
Blodgett; Blodgett had been criminally responsible for his acts, but 
nonetheless was properly subject to later PP commitment.195
In addition, the court rejected Linehan’s argument that an 
antisocial personality disorder (or “APD”) is constitutionally
insufficient to meet the mental disorder requirement for
191. Id. at 182 (citation omitted).
192. Id. at 183.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.  Of course, the same may be true of a person civilly committed as 
“mentally ill and dangerous to the public” as defined in Minnesota Statute
section 253B.02, subdivision 17 (2002).  A person may be mentally ill for purposes 
of civil commitment, but nonetheless not meet the requirements of M’Naghten to 
be relieved of criminal responsibility. Compare, e.g., State v. Wendler, 312 Minn. 
432, 436, 252 N.W.2d 266, 269 (1977), with In re K.B.C., 308 N.W.2d 495, 497 
(Minn. 1981) (holding Wendler did not meet standard for acquittal by reason of 
insanity, but was committed as mentally ill and dangerous). See MINN.
STAT. § 611.026 (2002) (stating Minnesota criminal insanity test as: “person . . .
laboring under such a defect of reason, from [mental illness or deficiency], as not 
to know the nature of the act, or that it was wrong”).  Nor does logic require that 
the criminally responsible/civilly committable categories be mutually exclusive.
The purposes of criminal conviction and criminal commitment are necessarily 
different.  The purpose of the insanity defense in the criminal system is to make a 
“moral judgment of the culpability of the accused.”  State v. Bouwman, 328 
N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 1982) (citation omitted); see also In re Blodgett, 510 
N.W.2d 910, 918 n.16 (Minn. 1994).  The purpose of the “police power” civil 
commitment, on the other hand, is to protect the public from one whose mental 
disorder renders him dangerous. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914, 916; Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
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commitment.196  The court said that Linehan’s APD diagnosis did 
not simply characterize his past antisocial conduct, but rather was 
based significantly on his disordered mental processes, specifically 
his lack of empathy and remorse.197  The Court noted that the 
purpose of the APD diagnosis is “to identify an underlying mental
disorder that accounts for the behavior,” and that it did so in 
Linehan’s case.198
The court also found no merit in Linehan’s equal protection 
claim.199  Linehan asserted that the SDP law unconstitutionally 
discriminates among persons who present a sexual danger, based 
upon whether they have mental disorders.200  The court held that 
limiting the application of the statute to persons with mental 
disorders serves the State’s interest in predicting which persons will 
engage in harmful conduct, as well as the State’s interest in
providing treatment to sexual predators.201
Finally, the court rejected Linehan’s ex post facto and double 
jeopardy claims, holding that commitment under the law is not for 
punitive purposes.202  The court noted that Minnesota has made a 
substantial investment to treat persons committed under the act, 
both in statute and by actual implementation of a treatment
program.203  The court said that the “purpose and effect of the SDP 
Act is therefore predominantly remedial, not punitive.”204
E. 1997—Kansas v. Hendricks
Several months after Linehan III, in June 1997, the United 
States Supreme Court issued its decision in Kansas v. Hendricks.205
By a 5-4 margin, the Court upheld the commitment of Leroy 
Hendricks, who had been civilly committed under Kansas’
“Sexually Violent Predator Act.”206  That Act defined a “sexually
violent predator” as “any person who has been convicted of or 
charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a 
196. Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 193.
197. Id. at 185.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 187.
200. Id. at 186.
201. Id. at 186-87.
202. Id. at 187-89.
203. Id. at 188.
204. Id.
205. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
206. Id. at 371, 373.
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mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the
person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.”207
Hendricks was civilly committed at the completion of his
prison term for sexually molesting two young boys.208  He had a 
long history of sexually molesting children.209  During the civil 
commitment proceedings, Hendricks told an examiner that he 
“[could]n’t control the urge” to molest children,210 and the experts 
diagnosed Hendricks with pedophilia.211  A jury found that
Hendricks met the requirements of the Kansas law, and he was 
civilly committed to a state treatment program.212
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed Hendricks’
commitment.213  That court held that the commitment violated 
substantive due process because the law did not require, and 
Hendricks’ pedophilia did not constitute, a “mental illness.”214
Because it concluded that Hendricks’ commitment violated
substantive due process, the majority of the Kansas court did not 
reach his double jeopardy and ex post facto arguments.215
The United States Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari 
to review both the substantive due process and the double
jeopardy/ex post facto claims.216  The high Court rejected all of 
these claims and reversed the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision.217
In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court first addressed 
Hendricks’ claim that substantive due process requires that civil 
commitment be based on a “mental illness” as that term may be 
defined by the psychiatric profession.218  “Contrary to Hendricks’ 
assertion,” the Court said, “the term ‘mental illness’ is devoid of any 
talismanic significance.”219  Instead, the Court observed: “[W]e have 
traditionally left to legislators the task of defining terms of a
207. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 352.
208. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 354.
209. Id. at 350, 354.
210. Id. at 355.
211. Id. at 356 n.2.
212. Id. at 355-56.
213. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996).
214. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356; In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138.
215. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356.
216. Kansas v. Hendricks, 518 U.S. 1004 (1996) (granting cross petitions for 
writ of certiorari); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360-61.
217. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
218. Id. at 358-59.
219. Id. at 359.
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medical nature that have legal significance.”220  The Court held that 
the Kansas law’s mental disorder requirement satisfied the
requirements of substantive due process saying: “The
precommitment requirement of a ‘mental abnormality’ or
‘personality disorder’ is consistent with the requirements of . . .
other statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows the class of 
persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to
control their dangerousness.”221
The Court also considered Hendricks’ double jeopardy and ex 
post facto arguments.  The court stated “as a threshold matter, 
commitment under the Act does not implicate either of the two 
primary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or
deterrence.”222  In addressing this issue, Hendricks firmly settled a 
question that had troubled many courts—whether civil
confinement of a dangerous person primarily for purposes of 
public protection is a non-punitive civil purpose.  Such
confinement is sometimes derisively termed “preventive
detention.”223  The Supreme Court clearly held that such
confinement is not punitive for the purposes of double jeopardy 
and ex post facto prohibitions, saying: “[T]hat the Act’s ‘overriding 
concern’ was the continued ‘segregation of sexually violent
offenders’ is consistent with our conclusion that the Act establishes 
civil proceedings.”224
While Justice Kennedy offered additional comments in a
concurring opinion, he nonetheless joined the Court’s majority 
opinion “in full.”225
Justice Breyer, joined by three other justices, dissented.226  He 
agreed that Hendricks’ mental disorder was sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of substantive due process.227  But he stated that he 
did “not subscribe to all of [the] reasoning” of the majority
opinion,228 and instead identified three limiting circumstances that 
220. Id.
221. Id. at 358.
222. Id. at 361-62.
223. See, e.g., In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 918 (Minn. 1994) (Wahl, J., 
dissenting); In re Linehan (Linehan III), 544 N.W.2d 308, 326 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1996) (Randall, J., dissenting), aff’d, 557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996), vacated and 
remanded, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997), aff’d as modified, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999).
224. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366 (citation omitted).
225. Id. at 371 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
226. Id. at 373 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 374.
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he believed combined to make Hendricks’ disorder constitutionally 
sufficient for commitment: “(1) many mental health professionals 
consider pedophilia a serious mental disorder; and (2) Hendricks
suffers from a classic case of irresistible impulse, namely he is so 
afflicted with pedophilia that he cannot ‘control the urge’ to 
molest children; and (3) his pedophilia presents a serious danger 
to those children . . . .” 229
While Justice Breyer agreed that substantive due process was 
satisfied in Hendricks’ case, he concluded that Hendricks’
commitment constituted punishment, and was thus precluded by 
the prohibition against ex post facto laws.230  Justice Breyer posited 
that a remedial, nonpunitive law would be expected to provide 
treatment for a person committed because of a mental
abnormality, to the extent that such treatment may be available.231
He said that Kansas delayed treatment until after the person’s 
prison sentence was completed, that the state did not attempt to 
provide meaningful treatment to persons even after commitment, 
and that Kansas law did not require the consideration of
alternatives less restrictive than placement in the state treatment 
program.232  He concluded: “The statutory provisions before us do 
amount to punishment primarily because . . . the legislature did 
not tailor the statute to fit the nonpunitive civil aim of treatment, 
which it concedes exists in Hendricks’ case.”233
F. 1999—“Once More, With Feeling”—Linehan IV
Meanwhile, back in the Linehan case, Linehan had petitioned 
for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court to review the 1996
Linehan III state court decision rejecting his challenge to the SDP 
law.  After deciding Hendricks, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the 
Linehan III decision and remanded it to the Minnesota Supreme 
Court to reconsider in light of Hendricks.234  The Minnesota
Supreme Court issued its decision, Linehan IV, 235 in mid-1999.
In a 4-2-1 decision, the state court in Linehan IV again upheld 
the constitutionality of the SDP law, but adopted an interpretation 
229. Id. at 376-77.
230. Id. at 389.
231. Id. at 382-83.
232. Id. at 383-89.
233. Id. at 396.
234. Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997).
235. In re Linehan (Linehan IV), 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999).
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of Hendricks midway between the positions argued by Linehan and 
the State.236  Linehan argued that substantive due process, as 
interpreted in Hendricks, requires an utter lack of power to control 
(i.e., the Pearson standard237) to support a sexual predator civil 
commitment.238  The State contended that Hendricks did not 
require a separate showing of inability to control, but instead held 
that the three elements of the Kansas statute (equivalent to those of 
Minnesota’s SDP law) “narrow[ed] the class of persons eligible for 
commitment to those who are unable to control their
dangerousness.”239  The State’s alternative argument on this point 
was that, even if Hendricks required some showing of inability to 
control, it was not a complete or utter inability to control, as Linehan 
argued, but only lack of adequate control, or difficulty in controlling 
behavior.240
This alternative argument is the position the Minnesota
Supreme court adopted in Linehan IV.  The court held that, despite
the SDP law’s statement that the petitioner need not show inability 
to control, the law must be interpreted in light of Hendricks to 
require a showing of some impairment of that ability—that the 
person’s mental disorder “does not allow [him] to adequately
control [his] sexual impulses.”241
Linehan also argued that Hendricks provided additional
support for his double jeopardy and ex post facto arguments, and 
that Hendricks required states to provide certain procedural
measures, including jury trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
and periodic review with the burden on the state to show that the 
commitment requirements continue to be met.242  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Linehan IV responded that Hendricks supported 
the state court’s previous rejection of Linehan’s double jeopardy 
and ex post facto arguments in Linehan III, and that the U.S. 
236. Id. at 878.
237. State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 555, 287 N.W. 297, 
302 (1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
238. Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 872.
239. Brief for State of Minnesota at 16, 13-22, Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d 867 
(Minn. 1999) (Nos. C1-95-2022, C3-96-511) (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358).
240. Id. at 22-24 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 362).
241. Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 876.  The court then examined whether the 
record showed that Linehan satisfied the commitment standard identified in the 
decision and affirmed Linehan’s commitment, holding that the “district court 
records . . . are replete with findings concerning appellant’s lack of volitional 
control over his sexually dangerous tendencies.” Id.
242. Id. at 871 & n.2.
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Supreme Court had not considered any procedural due process 
arguments in Hendricks.243
Justice Page dissented from the court’s decision upholding the 
law.244  Justice Lancaster wrote a decision, joined by Justice Paul 
Anderson, concurring in part and dissenting in part.245  These latter 
two justices did not disagree with the majority’s interpretation of 
Hendricks, or the determination that Linehan satisfied the “inability 
to control” standard.246  But they did not believe it possible to 
interpret the SDP law to contain an “inability to control”
requirement.247
The U.S. Supreme Court denied Linehan’s certiorari
petition.248
G. 2002—The U.S. Supreme Court Strikes Again—Kansas v. Crane
The U.S. Supreme Court’s opportunity to clarify Hendricks
arose in another Kansas case, Kansas v. Crane.249  In In re Crane, the 
Kansas Supreme Court had overturned a sexual predator civil 
commitment, holding that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hendricks required “a finding that the defendant cannot control his 
dangerous behavior.”250  The Kansas court reversed Crane’s
commitment and required a new trial because the jury had not 
243. Id. at 871-72, 871 n.2.
244. Id. at 878 (Page, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 885 (Lancaster, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 886.
247. Id. at 886-87.  The Linehan IV majority and the concurring/dissenting 
justices made this issue more difficult than necessary.  Linehan could challenge 
the validity of the statute only as applied to him.  Except in limited circumstances 
(not present here), “a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied 
will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably
be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court.”
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973).  Thus, if Linehan manifested 
the inability to control required by Hendricks, his commitment would not be 
invalid simply because the statutory language did not contain such a requirement.
Indeed, this is precisely what occurred in Hendricks.  Even though the Kansas 
statute did not contain an inability-to-control requirement, the Court affirmed 
Hendricks’ commitment because he had the constitutionally required inability to 
control.  It was therefore unnecessary for the court in Linehan IV to interpret the 
statute to contain an inability-to-control requirement.  Instead, the Court could 
have held simply that a person’s commitment under the statute would be
constitutional only if he were shown to have the required level of inability to 
control.
248. Linehan v. Minnesota, 528 U.S. 1049 (1999).
249. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
250. 7 P.3d 285, 290 (Kan. 2000), vacated, 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
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been instructed to make such a finding.251
The U.S. Supreme Court granted Kansas’ petition for
certiorari.252  Among other things, the Kansas court’s decision in In
re Crane, by requiring a total lack of control,253 directly conflicted 
with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Linehan IV.254
The parties in Crane made the same basic arguments that the 
parties in Linehan IV made to the Minnesota Supreme Court.255
Crane argued that Hendricks required the State to show that the 
person has a complete inability to control his behavior.256  The 
State, on the other hand, argued that no showing of inability to 
control is required, except for that implicit in the commitment 
standard—that the person engages in harmful conduct because of
his mental disorder.257
And, like the Minnesota Supreme Court in Linehan IV, the 
high Court adopted an intermediate position.258  The Court, this 
time with Justice Breyer writing the majority opinion, concluded 
that the state court’s reading of Hendricks had been too
restrictive.259  The high Court held that the Constitution, as
interpreted in Hendricks, “set forth no requirement of total or 
complete lack of control,”260 but rather Hendricks referred to a 
disorder “that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to 
control his dangerous behavior.”261  The Crane Court then
observed: “The word ‘difficult’ indicates that the lack of control to 
which [Hendricks] referred was not absolute,” and that “an
absolutist approach is unworkable.”262
But the Court also rejected the State’s argument that no 
separate showing of inability to control is required, instead
holding:
251. Id.
252. Kansas v. Crane, 532 U.S. 957 (2001).
253. While the Kansas court’s decision was less than clear on this point, this is 
the interpretation later given it by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Crane, 534 U.S. at 
411.
254. Compare Crane, 534 U.S. at 411, with In re Linehan (Linehan IV), 594 
N.W.2d 867, 876-79 (Minn. 1999).
255. Compare Crane, 534 U.S. at 411, with Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 872-73.
256. Crane, 534 U.S. at 411.
257. Id. at 411-12.
258. Compare Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 875-76, with Crane, 534 U.S. at 411.
259. Crane, 534 U.S at 409.
260. Id. at 411.
261. Id. (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358).
262. Id.
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[W]e recognize that in cases where lack of control is at 
issue, “inability to control behavior” will not be
demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is enough to 
say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling 
behavior.  And this, when viewed in light of such features of 
the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the 
severity of the mental abnormality itself, [is] sufficient to 
distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious 
mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to 
civil commitment from the dangerous but typical
recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.263
The Supreme Court made it clear that it was not prescribing 
the precise terms that must be contained in States’ commitment 
standards:
We recognize that Hendricks as so read provides a less 
precise constitutional standard than would those more 
definite rules for which the parties have argued.  But the 
Constitution’s safeguards of human liberty in the area of 
mental illness and the law are not always best enforced 
through precise bright-line rules.  For one thing, the 
States retain considerable leeway in defining the mental 
abnormalities and personality disorders that make an
individual eligible for commitment.  For another, the 
science of psychiatry, which informs but does not control 
ultimate legal determinations, is an ever-advancing
science, whose distinctions do not seek precisely to mirror 
those of the law.  Consequently, we have sought to provide 
constitutional guidance in this area by proceeding
deliberately and contextually, elaborating generally stated 
constitutional standards and objectives as specific
circumstances require. Hendricks embodied that
approach.264
The Court also engaged in an intriguingly oblique discussion 
of “volitional impairment” of ability to control, as opposed to 
“emotional impairment” or “cognitive impairment.”265  The Court 
explained that, by “volitional impairment,” it referred to situations 
in which the person has sexual urges that the person has particular 
difficulty in controlling:
We agree that Hendricks limited its discussion to volitional 
263. Id. at 413 (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 413-14 (citations omitted).
265. See id. at 414-15.
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disabilities.  And that fact is not surprising.  The case 
involved an individual suffering from pedophilia—a
mental abnormality that critically involves what a lay
person might describe as a lack of control.  DSM-IV 571-
572 (listing as a diagnostic criterion for pedophilia that an 
individual have acted on, or been affected by, “sexual 
urges” toward children).  Hendricks himself stated that he 
could not “control the urge” to molest children.  In 
addition, our cases suggest that civil commitment of
dangerous sexual offenders will normally involve
individuals who find it particularly difficult to control 
their behavior—in the general sense described above.
And it is often appropriate to say of such individuals, in 
ordinary English, that they are “unable to control their 
dangerousness.”266
But the Court appeared to indicate that commitment would be 
permissible in cases of “emotional” abnormalities, as well as
“volitional” ones:
Hendricks must be read in context.  The Court did not 
draw a clear distinction between the purely “emotional” 
sexually related mental abnormality and the “volitional.”
Here, as in other areas of psychiatry, there may be
“considerable overlap between a . . . defective
understanding or appreciation and . . . [an] ability to 
control . . . behavior.”  Nor, when considering civil
commitment, have we ordinarily distinguished for
constitutional purposes among volitional, emotional, and 
cognitive impairments.267
By this discussion, the Court was apparently recognizing that 
“serious difficulty in controlling behavior” could arise not only 
where the person’s disorder renders him unable to avoid sexual 
assault, despite his desire to avoid it, but also in situations where 
the disorder causes the person to want to engage in sexual assault 
(emotional impairments) or causes the person to not understand 
the nature of what he is doing (cognitive impairments).
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas (who had authored the 
Court’s opinion in Hendricks), dissented from the majority
opinion.268  They disagreed emphatically with the Crane majority’s 
interpretation of Justice Thomas’ opinion for the Court in
266. Id. (citations omitted).
267. Id. at 415 (additions and ellipses in original) (citations omitted).
268. Id.  (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Hendricks: “It could not be clearer that, in the Court’s estimation 
[in Hendricks], the very existence of a mental abnormality or 
personality disorder that causes a likelihood of repeat sexual
violence in itself establishes the requisite ‘difficulty if not
impossibility’ of control.”269
H. Crane Applied in Minnesota
Following Crane, several committed persons have raised the 
legal claim that the Linehan IV standard does not comply with 
Crane.  To date, these challenges have been easily rejected.
Immediately after the decision in Crane, Jimmie Ramey
appealed his 2001 SDP commitment to the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals.270  He argued that the Linehan IV standard under which he 
was committed—“does not allow them to adequately control”—did
not comply with the Crane requirement that “there must be proof 
of serious difficulty in controlling behavior” or Crane’s requirement
that the person’s disorder must be sufficient to distinguish him 
from the ordinary criminal recidivist.  The court of appeals rejected 
the claim, holding that the Linehan IV standard comports with 
Crane,271 and the state supreme court denied review.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals also addressed the same issue 
in a second case, In re Martinelli.272  In a 2000 decision, the state 
court of appeals had held that Martinelli’s SDP commitment
satisfied the Linehan IV standard, and the state supreme court 
denied review.273  Martinelli petitioned for certiorari to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, asserting that the Linehan IV standard and its 
application in his case did not comply with Hendricks.  After it 
decided Crane in January 2002, the Supreme Court granted
Martinelli’s certiorari petition and vacated and remanded to the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals to reconsider the case in light of 
269. Id. at 419-20.
270. In re Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 17, 2002).
271. Id. at 267.  The appellate court also rejected Ramey’s claim that
Linehan IV’s inability-to-adequately-control requirement was unconstitutionally
vague. Id. at 267-68.
272. In re Martinelli, 649 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 29, 2002), cert denied, No. 02-8775, 2003 WL 271237 (U.S. Mar. 24, 
2003).
273. In re Martinelli, No. C4-00-748, 2000 WL 1285430 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 12, 2000), review denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 2002), vacated and remanded, 534 U.S. 
1160 (2002).
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Crane.274
As in Ramey, the state appellate court rejected Martinelli’s 
claim, holding that the Linehan IV standard was consistent with 
Crane.  The appellate court concluded that Crane does require “a 
judicial finding of ‘lack of control.’”275  But the court termed the 
difference between the Crane “serious difficulty in controlling 
behavior” standard and Linehan IV’s “does not allow them to
adequately control their sexual impulses” standard only a “semantic 
distinction.”276  It noted that the U.S. Supreme Court in Crane had 
declined to “give the phrase ‘lack of control’ a particularly narrow 
or technical meaning,” and had expressly stated that it “was not 
laying down any ‘bright line rules.’”277  The appellate court held 
that Martinelli’s lack of ability to control, considered in light of his 
diagnosis of hebephilia and antisocial personality disorder, “was 
sufficient to distinguish Martinelli from the ‘typical recidivist’ 
offender, as required by Crane.”278  The state supreme court denied 
Martinelli’s petition for review, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied 
his certiorari petition.279
The third significant case to address the Linehan IV/Crane issue 
was an Eighth Circuit decision involving Linehan, himself.280  After 
the U.S. Supreme Court denied his certiorari petition seeking to 
review the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Linehan IV decision,
Linehan brought a federal habeas petition contending that the 
Linehan IV standard did not comply with the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Hendricks.281  The federal district court rejected the 
claim, and Linehan appealed to the Eighth Circuit.282  While his 
appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Crane, and the 
issue became whether the Linehan IV standard complied with Crane.
The circuit court issued its decision in January 2003, rejecting 
Linehan’s habeas claim and holding that the Minnesota standard 
complies with the dictates of Crane.283  Significantly, the court held 
that evidence meeting the Linehan IV standard is per se sufficient to 
274. Martinelli v. Minnesota, 534 U.S. 1160 (2002).
275. In re Martinelli, 649 N.W.2d at 890.
276. Id. at 891.
277. Id. at 890 (quoting Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002)).
278. Id.
279. Martinelli, 534 U.S. at 1160.
280. Linehan v. Milczark, 315 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2003).
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distinguish the committed person from the typical recidivist, and 
thus that Crane’s “sufficient to distinguish” language does not 
impose a separate requirement to be proved.  The circuit court 
said:
The standard enunciated in Linehan IV requires a finding 
of “lack of adequate control” in relation to a properly 
diagnosed disorder or dysfunction, as well as findings of 
past sexual violence and resultant likelihood of future 
sexually dangerous behavior.  This combination of
required findings will adequately distinguish an offender
subject to civil commitment, who has difficulty controlling 
his behavior because of a disorder or dysfunction, from 
the more typical offender with behavioral problems, who 
is best dealt with in the criminal system. The SDP Act 
standard, as narrowed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
Linehan IV, therefore adequately distinguishes between the typical 
recidivist and the dangerous sexual offender and complies with 
substantive due process requirements.284
V. SETTLED CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES—
WHAT WE KNOW FOR SURE, OR PRETTY SURE
When the increased use of civil commitment of sexual
predators began in 1991, many constitutional issues were unsettled.
The answers to most of those questions now seem fairly clear.
Except for the Supreme Court’s placement of some limitation on 
the “mental disorder” element, the final court decisions have now 
uniformly rejected the constitutional challenges.  Here is what we 
know, at least for now.
A. Civil Commitment of Sexual Predators Does Not Constitute Double 
Jeopardy or Imposition of an Ex Post Facto Law
A frequent refrain of those opposing civil commitment of 
sexual predators is that such commitment constitutes
“punishment.”285  Based on this premise, opponents have asserted
that commitment following a criminal prison term constitutes
impermissible double jeopardy, and commitment under a law 
enacted after the person’s sexual assaults relies upon an ex post 
284. Id. at 927 (emphasis added).
285. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360-61 (1997); C. Peter 
Erlinder, Minnesota’s Gulag: Involuntary Treatment for the “Politically Ill,” 19 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 99, 122-23, 156 (1993).
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facto law.286
1. Settled Issues
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court definitively rejected such 
arguments.  The Court said that “[t]he categorization of a
particular proceeding as civil or criminal ‘is first of all a question of 
statutory construction.’  We must initially ascertain whether the 
legislature meant to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.  If so, we
ordinarily defer to the legislature’s stated intent.”287  Examining the 
Kansas statute, the Court easily concluded that it was civil in form, 
and that “[n]othing on the face of the statute suggests that the 
legislature sought to create anything other than a civil commitment 
scheme designed to protect the public from harm.”288
The Court recognized that the inquiry does not necessarily 
end there; however, the Legislature’s characterization will be
rejected “only where a party challenging the statute provides ‘the 
clearest proof’ that ‘the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in 
purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it 
‘civil.’”289  The Court found such proof lacking with respect to the 
Kansas statute.290  The Court held:
• “the Act does not implicate either of the two primary
objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or
deterrence”;291
• the statute did not impose retribution for prior conduct, but 
rather “such conduct is used solely for evidentiary purposes, 
either to demonstrate that a ‘mental abnormality’ exists or 
to support a finding of future dangerousness”;292
• “the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably 
lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed 
punishment”;293
• the fact that Kansas chose to provide many of the same 
procedures used in criminal cases “does not transform a 
civil commitment proceeding into a criminal
286. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360-61.
287. Id. at 361 (citation omitted).
288. Id. (emphasis added).
289. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
290. Id. at 368-69.
291. Id. at 361-62.
292. Id. at 362.
293. Id. at 363.
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prosecution”;294
• the fact that the primary purpose of commitment was public 
protection, and that treatment was secondary, did not 
render the law punitive, nor did the fact that some
committed persons may be untreatable:
[T]he Kansas court’s determination that the Act’s
“overriding concern” was the continued “segregation of 
sexually violent offenders” is consistent with our
conclusion that the Act establishes civil proceedings,
especially when that concern is coupled with the State’s 
ancillary goal of providing treatment to those offenders, if 
such is possible.  While we have upheld state civil
commitment statutes that aim both to incapacitate and to 
treat, we have never held that the Constitution prevents a 
State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment 
is available, but who nevertheless pose a danger to others.
A State could hardly be seen as furthering a “punitive”
purpose by involuntarily confining persons affected with 
an untreatable, highly contagious disease.295
The Court summarized its double jeopardy/ex post facto
analysis:
Where the State has “disavowed any punitive intent”; 
limited confinement to a small segment of particularly 
dangerous individuals; provided strict procedural
safeguards; directed that confined persons be segregated 
from the general prison population and afforded the 
same status as others who have been civilly committed;
recommended treatment if such is possible; and
permitted immediate release upon a showing that the 
individual is no longer dangerous or mentally impaired, 
we cannot say that it acted with punitive intent.296
294. Id. at 364-65.
295. Id. at 366 (citations omitted).
296. Id. at 368-69.  In Seling v. Young, the Supreme Court gave this summary of 
the double jeopardy/ex post facto holding of Hendricks:
We concluded that the confined individual in [Hendricks] had failed to 
satisfy his burden with respect to the Kansas Act.  We noted several
factors: The Act did not implicate retribution or deterrence; prior 
criminal convictions were used as evidence in the commitment
proceedings, but were not a prerequisite to confinement; the Act 
required no finding of scienter to commit a person; the Act was not 
intended to function as a deterrent; and although the procedural 
safeguards were similar to those in the criminal context, they did not 
alter the character of the scheme.
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After Linehan III was remanded to the Minnesota Supreme 
Court to reconsider in light of Hendricks, the state court held that 
Hendricks supported the Minnesota court’s previous determination 
that commitment under the SDP law did not violate double
jeopardy and ex post facto prohibitions, because the Minnesota law 
was similar to the Kansas law in relevant respects.297  In federal 
habeas petitions after Hendricks, the federal district court has also 
concluded that Hendricks resolves any double jeopardy or ex post 
facto challenge to the SPP or SDP law.298
2. Unsettled Issues
A remaining issue that is unclear is whether and when the 
actual conditions of committed persons’ treatment and
confinement may be considered in making the punitiveness
determination.  In a 2001 decision, Seling v. Young, the U.S. 
Supreme Court considered whether a committed person could 
challenge his commitment on double jeopardy and ex post facto 
grounds based on his allegation that the post-commitment
conditions of his treatment program rendered his commitment 
punitive.299  The Court rejected Young’s claim, which it termed an 
“as applied” challenge,300 saying that the Court had “expressly 
disapproved of evaluating the civil nature of an Act by reference to 
We also examined the conditions of confinement provided by the 
Act. . . .  We noted . . . that conditions within the unit were essentially
the same as conditions for other involuntarily committed persons in 
mental hospitals.  Moreover, confinement under the Act was not 
necessarily indefinite in duration.  Finally, we observed that in addition 
to protecting the public, the Act also provided treatment for sexually 
violent predators.  We acknowledged that not all mental conditions 
were treatable.  For those individuals with untreatable conditions, 
however, we explained that there was no federal constitutional bar to 
their civil confinement, because the State had an interest in protecting 
the public from dangerous individuals with treatable as well as
untreatable conditions.
531 U.S. 250, 261-62 (2001) (citations omitted).
297. In re Linehan (Linehan IV), 594 N.W.2d 867, 871-72 (Minn. 1999).
298. Order at 3-4, Linehan v. Milczark (D. Minn. Sept. 20, 2001) (No. 00-2635)
(DSD/AJB), aff’d on other grounds, 315 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2003); Report and 
Recomm. at 13-16, Linehan v. Milczark (D. Minn. Aug. 8, 2001) (No. 00-2635)
(DSD/AJB); Report and Recomm. at 13-14, Woodruff v. O’Keefe, (D. Minn. 
May 30, 2001) (No. 00-2478) (JMR/FLN).
299. 531 U.S. 250, 250 (2001).
300. Id. at 263.
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the effect the Act has on a single individual.”301
The Court’s precise holding in Seling is not wholly clear.  On 
the one hand, the Court observed that the “particular features of 
confinement may affect how a confinement scheme is evaluated to 
determine whether it is civil rather than punitive.”302  But the Court 
appeared to say that such evidence could, at most, affect a
determination of whether the law was punitive “in the first
instance.”303  The Court stated that there must be a “final
determination” of whether the law is punitive and that “the query 
must be answered definitively”: “The civil nature of a confinement 
scheme cannot be altered based merely on vagaries in the
implementation of the authorizing statute.”304
Seling clearly holds that a person already committed cannot 
challenge his commitment on double jeopardy or ex post facto 
grounds based on the individual conditions of his treatment and 
confinement following commitment.305  But the decision is murky 
regarding when the actual conditions of the treatment program, as 
opposed to the conditions of treatment described by the governing 
statute, may be used to support a challenge at the time of the 
commitment trial.306
B. A Person May Be Civilly Committed As Sexually Dangerous Even If 
There Is No Effective Treatment, But (Probably) Available 
Treatment Must Be Offered
The Supreme Court’s discussion in Hendricks, quoted above, 
makes it abundantly clear that persons can be civilly committed as 
sexually dangerous even if they personally are not amenable to 
treatment or if effective treatment for sex offenders is not
available.307  The Court reiterated this proposition in Seling.308
Even the dissenting justices in Hendricks did not disagree on 
this point.  Justice Breyer wrote: “[M]y decision [does not]
preclude a State from deciding that a certain subset of people are 
mentally ill, dangerous, and untreatable, and that confinement of 
301. Id. at 262.





307. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997).
308. Seling, 531 U.S. at 262.
46
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss4/13
KIRWIN_FORMATTED 3/27/2003 11:47 PM
2003] ONE ARROW IN THE QUIVER 1181
this subset is therefore necessary.”309  The dissenters argued only 
that, in order to avoid acting in a punitive manner, the State must 
provide what treatment is possible: “[W]hen a State decides
offenders can be treated and confines an offender to provide that 
treatment, but then refuses to provide it, the refusal to treat . . .
begins to look punitive.”310  The dissent cited the Court’s language 
in a previous decision stating that failure to use the least-harsh
methods to accomplish a nonpunitive objective may show that the 
legislature’s purpose was to punish.311
The majority did not dispute the dissent’s analysis on this 
point, but did not expressly adopt it either.  The majority did 
respond at length to the dissent’s conclusion that Kansas was not 
making a good faith effort to provide treatment.312  From this it 
might be argued that the majority agreed that a bona fide attempt 
to provide treatment is constitutionally required.  Moreover, in its 
recap of factors showing the nonpunitive nature of the law, the 
majority of the Court in both Hendricks and Seling recited that “the 
State has . . .  recommended treatment if such is possible.”313  But in 
neither case did the majority expressly hold, or need to hold, that it 
was a necessary factor.  The Supreme Court has therefore not
definitively answered that question.
C. Civil Commitment of Persons As Sexually Dangerous Generally
Does Not Violate Equal Protection
Both the SPP and SDP statutes have been challenged on equal 
protection grounds, without success.  These challenges have
identified various allegedly unconstitutional “classifications.”
The classification challenged at the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Pearson is not completely clear from the decision.  It appears that 
Pearson generally challenged the power of the Legislature to 
identify the class of persons covered by the statute for special 
treatment.314  The Court rejected the claim, employing “rational 
basis” analysis, saying: “[T]he legislature is free to recognize
degrees of harm, and it may confine its restrictions to those classes 
309. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 390 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 388 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979)).
312. Id. at 365-69.
313. Id. at 368. See also Seling, 531 U.S. at 261-62.
314. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 274-75 (1940).
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of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest.”315
In Blodgett, the Minnesota Supreme Court described Blodgett’s 
equal protection claim as “obscure,” but concluded that he was 
apparently challenging the legislative distinction between persons 
who are sexually dangerous due to mental disorders and similarly 
dangerous persons who are not disordered.316  The Blodgett court 
also considered an equal protection claim raised by an amicus that 
distinguishing between recidivist sex offenders and recidivists who 
engage in other kinds of crimes was unconstitutional.317  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected these two claims, applying an 
intermediate level of equal protection scrutiny.318  The court said 
that “the sexual predator poses a danger that is unlike any other,” 
and that the law “delineates genuine and substantial distinctions 
which define a class that victimizes women and children in a 
particular manner.”319
In Linehan III, the patient again challenged the classification 
between disordered and non-disordered sexual predators.320  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court once again rejected this challenge, with 
a more extensive and explicit explanation that it was applying 
intermediate scrutiny, rather than either strict scrutiny or rational-
basis scrutiny.321  The court explained that limiting the statute’s 
application to persons whose sexual dangerousness was due to 
mental disorders served two important purposes: to aid in the 
prediction of dangerousness322 and to serve the State’s interest in 
providing treatment to persons who are sexually dangerous.323
D. The Dangerousness Assessment Necessary to Civil Commitment of 
Sexual Predators Is Constitutional
Some persons challenge the “prediction of dangerousness” 
315. Id. at 275.
316. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn. 1994).
317. Id.
318. Id. (citing, inter alia, State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991) 
(describing Minnesota intermediate scrutiny equal protection review)).
319. Id. at 917.
320. In re Linehan (Linehan III), 557 N.W.2d 171, 186 (Minn. 1996), vacated 
and remanded, 522 U.S.1011 (1997), aff’d as modified, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999).
The Eighth Circuit, with minimal discussion, rejected the same claim in Bailey v. 
Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 1991).
321. Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 186.
322. Id. at 186-87.
323. Id. at 187.
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that is required by laws like the SPP and SDP laws.324  “Prediction” is 
a bit of a misnomer here because the court’s function is not to 
“predict” that the person will reoffend, but rather to assess the 
likelihood that the person will reoffend or to determine a “risk class” 
into which the person falls.325  Under the SDP law, for example, the 
court must determine that the person falls into the “highly likely” 
risk category.326
Even though this claim was not presented in Hendricks, the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s discussion rejects any such notion, citing its 
earlier decision in Schall v. Martin327 for the proposition that, “from 
a legal point of view there is nothing inherently unattainable about 
a prediction of future criminal conduct.”328  Likewise, informed 
commentators generally acknowledge that such risk assessments 
may constitutionally be used not only in civil commitments, but 
also in many other legal settings ranging from determining child 
custody, detaining a person before criminal trial, and even
imposing the death penalty.329
The Minnesota Supreme Court also has made it clear that 
assessment of risk in SPP and SDP cases is constitutional.330
Further, based on Linehan’s argument in Linehan I, the court has 
specified a list of six factors for trial courts to use in assessing risk, if 
evidence regarding those factors is offered.331  These factors include 
324. See, e.g., In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 917 n.15 (summarizing Blodgett’s 
argument); Eric S. Janus, Sexual Predator Commitment Laws: Lessons for Law and the 
Behavioral Sciences, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 5, 16-17 (2000) [hereinafter Janus, Lessons].
325. Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for Predictions of 
Dangerousness in Sex Offender Commitment Proceedings, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 33, 
42 (1997).
326. Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 180.  This is a standard higher than a fifty-one
percent-likelihood standard, and corresponds to the clear-and-convincing-
evidence standard. Id.
327. 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984).
328. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997); see also Minnesota ex rel.
Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 274 (1940) (stating that elements of PP 
definition, including likelihood of reoffense, “are as susceptible of proof as many 
of the criteria constantly applied in prosecutions for crime”).
329. Eric S. Janus, Sex Predator Commitment Laws: Constitutional But Unwise, 30 
PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 411, 414 (2000) [hereinafter Janus, Constitutional] (noting 
that “Hendricks confirms that a law’s reliance on prediction of dangerousness does 
not render the law unconstitutional.”); Janus & Meehl, supra note 325, at 36; 
Johnson, supra note 31, at 1184 n.309.
330. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 n.15 (Minn. 1994).
331. In re Linehan (Linehan I), 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994).  The court 
said:
[T]he trial court, in predicting serious danger to the public, should 
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actuarial risk assessment methods.332  But, in Linehan III, the court 
rejected Linehan’s argument that actuarial methods should
predominate over the other factors, stating that “dangerousness 
prediction under the SDP Act is not simply a matter for
statisticians.”333  Instead, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that 
the trial court can determine which factors are most helpful in a 
particular case and can also consider other risk factors not listed in 
Linehan I.334
E. The Kansas Commitment and Discharge Procedures Described in
Hendricks Are Not Constitutionally Required
The commitment and discharge procedures under
Minnesota’s SPP and SDP laws are not typical of the procedures 
used under such laws around the country.  The procedures under 
the Kansas statute at issue in Hendricks and Crane are more
common.  In Hendricks, the Supreme Court noted that the Kansas 
law provided for a right to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.335  If committed, the person was entitled to automatic 
annual judicial review, at which the State would be required to 
prove that the initial commitment standard continued to be met.336
consider the following factors if such evidence is presented: (a) the 
person’s relevant demographic characteristics (e.g., age, education, 
etc.); (b) the person’s history of violent behavior (paying particular 
attention to recency, severity, and frequency of violent acts); (c) the 
base rate statistics for violent behavior among individuals of this 
person’s background (e.g., data showing the rate at which rapists 
recidivate, the correlation between age and criminal sexual activity, 
etc.); (d) the sources of stress in the environment (cognitive and 
affective factors which indicate that the person may be predisposed to 
cope with stress in a violent or nonviolent manner); (e) the similarity 
of the present or future context to those contexts in which the person 
has used violence in the past; and (f) the person’s record with respect 
to sex therapy programs.  In reviewing psychopathic personality
commitments in the future, we will look to see whether these factors 
have been considered, particularly where, as here, there is a large gap 
of time between the petition for commitment and the appellant’s last 
sexual misconduct.
Id.
332. See Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 614 (referring to factors (a) and (c)).
333. In re Linehan (Linehan III), 557 N.W.2d 171, 191 (Minn. 1996), vacated
and remanded, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997), aff’d as modified, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 
1999).
334. Id.
335. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353-54 (1997).
336. Id. at 353.
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Among the factors the Supreme Court listed as showing the state’s 
non-punitive intent, the Court noted that Kansas had “provided 
strict procedural safeguards.”337
Minnesota’s procedures are different.  The standard of proof 
is clear and convincing evidence, and no jury is provided.338
Periodic review is not automatic, but rather the patient or the 
treatment facility must petition for relief.339  The petitioning party 
bears the burden of going forward with evidence sufficient to show 
entitlement to discharge or provisional discharge; only if this
burden is met does the party opposing such relief bear the burden 
of proof by clear and convincing evidence.340  Moreover, as
explained earlier,341 the standard in a discharge proceeding is 
related to, but not identical to, the standard for commitment.342
Since Hendricks, persons committed under the Minnesota
statutes have challenged their commitments on the ground that 
Minnesota does not provide procedures identical to those provided 
under the Kansas law.343  The Minnesota Supreme Court summarily 
rejected this claim in Linehan IV, saying that Hendricks provided no 
new basis for Linehan’s procedural arguments.344 Likewise, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected the claim in Joelson v. O’Keefe, 
stating that “the United States Supreme Court did not mandate the 
adoption of these procedures to maintain the constitutionality of a 
sexual predator commitment law.”345  The federal district court for 
Minnesota has also repeatedly rejected this claim,346 although in 
337. Id. at 368.
338. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 1(a) (2002).
339. Id., subd. 5(a).
340. MINN. STAT. § 253B.19, subd. 2 (2002); Caprice v. Gomez, 552 N.W.2d 
753, 757 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
341. See supra Part III.
342. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subds. 7, 15 (2002); Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 
312, 319 (Minn. 1995).
343. See, e.g., In re Linehan (Linehan IV), 594 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1999); 
Joelson v. O’Keefe, 594 N.W.2d 905, 910-11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
344. Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 871 n.2.
345. 594 N.W.2d 905, 910-11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
346. See Report and Recomm. at 16, Call v. O’Keefe (D. Minn 2000) (No. 98-
1532) (RHK/RLE):
[N]o where did the Court mandate every State to adopt such
procedures.  [Hendricks, 521 U.S.] at 364-65.  It was simply analyzing 
the statute so as to determine if it was punitive in nature.  The Court 
did not set in stone what procedures would be necessary in order for a 
civil commitment law, like Minnesota’s Sexual Psychopathic Personality 
Act, to withstand a constitutional challenge.  We should not assume, 
without a more explicit pronouncement, that the Court’s decision 
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one recent habeas corpus case that court granted a certificate of 
appealability allowing an appeal to the Eighth Circuit concerning a 
claim of right to a jury trial.347
F. The SDP Law’s Rebuttable Presumption Is Constitutional
The SDP law contains a harmfulness standard virtually
identical to the Rickmyer standard specified by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court for the SPP statute—“sexual conduct that creates a 
substantial likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to 
another.”348  But the SDP law adds a rebuttable presumption that if 
conduct would violate certain criminal statutes, including first-
through-fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, it also meets the 
harmfulness requirement.349
In In re Kindschy, the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered a 
claim that this rebuttable presumption is unconstitutional because 
it shifts the burden of proof to the proposed patient.350  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that the State must bear the burden of 
proof in civil commitment cases.351
The appellate court rejected Kindschy’s argument.  The court 
regarding Kansas’ law was meant to set the minimum standard with 
regard to civil commitment laws, especially when such a
pronouncement would affect many State laws.
See also Report and Recomm. at 14 and Order, Patterson v. O’Keefe (D. Minn 
2000) (No. 99-1195) (DWF/RLE); Order, Joelson v. O’Keefe (D. Minn. 2000) 
(No. 99-1196) (DWF/RLE); Order, Caprice v. O’Keefe (D. Minn. 2000) (No. 99-
1197) (DWF/RLE); Order, Mattson v. O’Keefe (D. Minn 2000) (No. 99-1198)
(DWF/RLE); Order, Duvall v. O’Keefe (D. Minn. 2000) (No. 99-1199)
(DWF/RLE); Report and Recomm. at 11-13 and Order at 2-3, Linehan v. Milczark
(D. Minn. 2001) (No. 00-2635) (DSD/AJB), aff’d on other grounds, 315 F.3d 920 
(8th Cir. 2003); Report and Recomm. at 6-10 & Mem. and Order, Poole v. O’Keefe 
(D. Minn 2002) (No. 01-1460) (PAM/JGL), certif. of appealability granted on jury trial
issue (addressing proof beyond reasonable doubt and jury trials) Report and 
Recomm. at 7-9, Woodruff v. O’Keefe (D. Minn. 2001) (No. 00-2478) (JMR/FLN).
In Patterson, Joelson, Caprice, Mattson, Duvall, both the district judge and the Eighth 
Circuit denied certificates of appealability.  The United States Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in all five cases. See Patterson v. O’Keefe, 534 U.S. 852 (2001); 
Joelson v. O’Keefe, 534 U.S. 851 (2001); Caprice v. Buckhalton, 534 U.S. 851 
(2001); Mattson v. O’Keefe, 534 U.S. 851 (2001); Duvall v. O’Keefe, 534 U.S. 852 
(2001) (all denying certiorari).
347. Poole v. O’Keefe (No. 01-1460) (D. Minn. Jan. 13, 2002) (granting
certificate of appealability only on jury trial issue).
348. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 7a(a) (2002).
349. Id. subd. 7a(b).
350. 634 N.W.2d 723, 730 (Minn. Ct. App.), review denied (Minn. Dec. 19,
2001).
351. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979).
52
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss4/13
KIRWIN_FORMATTED 3/27/2003 11:47 PM
2003] ONE ARROW IN THE QUIVER 1187
first noted that, under the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, a
presumption “imposes on the party against whom it is directed the 
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the
presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of
proof.”352  In addition, the court observed that Kindschy’s argument 
was akin to the claim rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones v. 
United States.353  In Jones, the Supreme Court held that it was 
constitutional for the government to automatically civilly commit a 
person based on his successful assertion of the insanity defense in a 
civil proceeding.354  The Supreme Court said that Congress could 
reasonably infer dangerousness, for purposes of the civil
commitment, from the person’s criminal act established in the 
criminal proceeding.355
G. The Statutes’ Least-Restrictive-Alternative Provision is 
Constitutional
Kindschy also challenged the statutory “least restrictive
alternative” provision, asserting that it unconstitutionally placed the 
burden of proof on him.356  For the “non-highly dangerous” 
commitment categories, Minnesota’s commitment act requires the 
court to commit the person to the least-restrictive available
treatment program that can meet the person’s needs.357  But the 
least-restrictive-alternative provisions for the “highly dangerous” 
commitments—MI&D, SPP and SDP—are different.  Those
provisions require the court to commit the person to the
Minnesota Security Hospital or the Minnesota Sex Offender
Program “unless the patient establishes by clear and convincing 
evidence that a less restrictive treatment program is available that is 
consistent with the patient’s treatment needs and the requirements 
of public safety.”358
352. Kindschy, 634 N.W.2d at 730 (quoting MINN. R. EVID. 301).
353. Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364-65 (1983)).
354. 463 U.S. at 364-65.
355. Id.
356. Kindschy, 634 N.W.2d at 731.
357. MINN. STAT. § 253B.09, subd. 1(a) (2002).
358. MINN. STAT. §§ 253B.18, subd. 1, 253B.185, subd. 1 (2002).  In In re Senty-
Haugen, 583 N.W.2d 266, 269-70 (Minn. 1998), the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that the least-restrictive-alternative provision that applies to the mentally ill, 
mentally retarded and chemically dependent commitment categories does not 
apply to MI&D, SPP and SDP commitments.  Responding to that decision, the 
Legislature adopted the special least-restrictive-alternative provisions for those 
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The court of appeals rejected Kindschy’s claim that this
provision unconstitutionally placed the burden on him.359  The 
court noted that the statute does not give a person committed as 
SPP or SDP the right to be placed in the least restrictive setting, but 
instead gives him the opportunity to show that an appropriate 
alternative placement is available.360
H. The Discharge Standard is Constitutional
The discharge standard under the SPP/SDP statutes has also 
been challenged.  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “due 
process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear 
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is 
committed.”361  As explained in Part III above, the discharge
standard for persons committed as SPP and SDP does not simply 
mirror the commitment standard—a person is not entitled to 
discharge as soon as it is shown that he no longer meets the 
commitment standard.  Instead, “[c]onfinement may continue 
without meeting this threshold if . . . the person continues to need 
treatment for his sexual disorder and continues to pose a danger to 
the public.”362  In Call v. Gomez, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
rejected the patient’s constitutional challenge to this discharge 
standard, concluding that as long as “the confinement still bears 
the reasonable relationship to the original reason for
commitment,” the constitutional requirement is met.363
VI. WHAT WE KNOW, AND DON’T, ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT OF MENTAL DISORDER
Ten years ago the constitutionality of the civil commitment of 
sexual predators was doubtful in the minds of many.  Probably the 
most substantial question was whether a mental disorder is
required and, if so, what kind.  For the most part, these questions 
are answered by Hendricks and Crane.
categories quoted in text. See Act of May 4, 1999, ch. 118, §§ 3, 6, 1999 Minn. Laws 
481, 482-83.
359. Kindschy, 634 N.W.2d at 731.
360. Id.
361. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
362. Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995).
363. Id.
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A. A Mental-Disorder-Type Element is Constitutionally Required to
Support the Civil Commitment of A Sexual Predator
First, Hendricks appears to make it clear that the Supreme 
Court would not approve civil commitment of sexual predators 
based simply on their past conduct and the prediction of likely 
future harm.  The Court said:
A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily 
not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite 
involuntary commitment.  We have sustained civil
commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of 
dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, 
such as a “mental illness” or “mental abnormality.”364
The Court clearly did not hold that a mental disorder or 
something akin to a mental disorder would be the only “additional 
factor” that would be constitutionally sufficient.365 But this was the 
additional factor contained in the Kansas statute366 and, indeed, in 
all of the other sexual predator commitment statutes around the 
country.367
The Supreme Court did not explain why an additional factor 
was necessary—why a sound assessment of future risk based in part 
on a history of harmful sexual conduct would not be sufficient.  In 
both Hendricks and Crane, the Court explained that the mental 
disorder requirement was necessary to distinguish the committed 
person “from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more 
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.”368
But the Court did not explain why such persons “more properly” 
364. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
365. Id. (stating commitment may be supported by  “some additional factor such 
as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality’”) (emphasis added). See also Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (describing Hendricks as allowing preventive 
detention only “where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental 
illness, outweighs the ‘individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding 
physical restraint”).
366. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994).
367. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3701 (7)(b) (Supp. 2002); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 6600(a), (c) (West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(10) (2002); 
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/5(b), (f) (2002); IOWA CODE § 229A.2(4), (9) (2000); 
MINN. STAT. § 253B, subd 18(c) (2002); MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480(5) (2000); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.2(6) (West Supp. 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(8)
(2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(1) (Law. Co-op. 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-
70.01 (Supp. 2002) (effective January 1, 2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(4), 
(12) (Michie 2002); WIS. STAT. § 980.01(2), (7) (1998).
368. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 410 (2002); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360.
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should be dealt with through the criminal process.  The Court’s 
reasoning contains an underlying assumption that cannot be
explained except by tautology.
Professor Peter Erlinder has provocatively suggested that the 
civil commitment of sexual predators, rather than dealing with 
such persons exclusively as criminals, opens the door to Soviet 
Union-type abuses of mental health commitment.369  But he too 
fails to explain why civil processes are more subject to abuse than 
criminal ones.
Further, it is not helpful to label commitment without a
disorder as “preventive detention.”370  All of the justices of the U.S. 
Supreme Court agree that civil commitment may be used to
confine a person to protect the public even where no effective 
treatment is currently available.371  Indeed, the Supreme Court itself 
has non-pejoratively referred to the civil commitment involved in 
Hendricks as permissible “preventive detention.”372
But this is not to advocate for civil commitment of sexual 
predators without a mental disorder component in the
commitment criteria.  From their inception sixty-six years ago, such 
statutes have regarded the persons subject to commitment as 
having mental abnormalities for which treatment is appropriate, 
and the states have generally included these commitments in their 
“mental health” commitment processes.  The Court’s analysis in 
Hendricks and Crane thus approves the commitment of sexual 
predators within a mental health framework.
B. The Purpose of the Supreme Court’s Mental Disorder Standard is 
Unclear
The Supreme Court in Crane also made clear—clearer than in 
Hendricks—the nature of the mental disorder it would require: “that 
there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”373
What this means and how the courts have implemented and should 
implement it, is discussed below.  But it may be helpful to attempt 
to ascertain why the Court chose this particular description of a 
369. Erlinder, supra note 285, at 158-59.
370. See, e.g., In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 918 (Minn. 1994) (Wahl, J., 
dissenting).
371. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366, 390 (Court’s opinion and Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
372. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-91 (2001).
373. Crane, 534 U.S. at 412.
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mental disorder and what purpose it serves in the Court’s
constitutional analysis.
Justice Breyer, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Hendricks
and later the majority opinion in Crane, introduced the inability-to-
control concept into the Court’s analysis.  In the Hendricks oral 
argument, groping for a standard to assess the constitutional
adequacy of a State’s mental disorder standard, Breyer asked
Hendricks’ counsel:
The issue is, in addition, you have to be mentally ill, and 
it’s like civil commitment, and how do you decide whether 
for legal purposes a person is sufficiently mentally ill?
. . . .
So what’s the definition distinguishing the one from
another, and what I’m going to ask you about is the ALI’s 
definition, which had for a different purpose to say that a 
person was insane if, as a result in part of a mental defect, 
he lacked substantial capacity, in this case it would be to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law, which 
would suggest a kind of irresistible impulse, a compulsion.
And we know that there is in one of the psychiatric 
associations’ brief evidence that some psychiatrists call this 
a kind of compulsion, so is the ALI test a possible test?374
When the Hendricks opinion was subsequently issued,
Justice Breyer concurred with the Court’s holding that Hendricks’ 
commitment satisfied substantive due process.375  He concluded 
that Kansas could constitutionally classify Hendricks as “mentally 
ill” because of the presence of three factors, one being that
“Hendricks suffers from a classic case of irresistible impulse,
namely, he is so afflicted with pedophilia that he cannot ‘control 
the urge’ to molest children.”376
Justice Breyer gave two reasons for resorting to the inability-to-
control standard.  First, citing the opinions of the United States 
and Minnesota Supreme Courts in Pearson, he said: “The law 
traditionally has considered this kind of abnormality akin to
insanity for purposes of confinement.”377  Second, he said, “[t]he 
notion of an ‘irresistible impulse’ often has helped to shape 
374. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (No. 95-9075, 95-1649) (Dec. 10, 
1996) (transcript available at 1996 WL 721073, at *49-50).
375. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 374.
376. Id. at 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
377. Id. at 375.
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criminal law’s insanity defense and to inform the related
recommendations of legal experts as they seek to translate the 
insights of mental health professionals into workable legal rules.”378
The many references to inability to control in the Hendricks
majority opinion were obviously meant simply to respond to
Justice Breyer’s contention: the Court was saying that the very terms 
of the Kansas statute (i.e., mental disorder that causes the person to 
act in a harmful manner) “by definition” identifies persons whose 
disorder “prevents them from exercising adequate control over 
their behavior.”379  Justice Thomas, the author of the Court’s
opinion in Hendricks, confirmed this interpretation of Hendricks by 
subscribing to the dissenting opinion in Crane.380
The point here is that it was Justice Breyer who came up with 
the inability-to-control standard for evaluating states’ commitment 
criteria, and he has given little explanation as to why that particular 
standard was chosen.  It appears that he was grasping for a 
standard, and inability to control was the only one offered.  It 
seems that he found some degree of comfort in that standard 
because it had been previously upheld for purposes of sexual 
predator commitment in Pearson and it was similar to one of the
common criminal insanity tests, thus providing some apparent 
legitimacy.
Justice Breyer’s near desperation to find some standard is 
shown by the fact that the one he chose—inability to control—has
been roundly criticized in recent years as being difficult to apply at 
best and devoid of content at worst.  Legal and psychiatric
commentators agree that whether a person is able to control his 
impulses—whether an impulse is truly irresistible—is ultimately 
unknowable.  Professor Stephen Morse has written:
[F]amously, we cannot distinguish between irresistible 
impulses and those impulses simply not resisted. . . . [T]he 
studies do not address and folk psychology does not know 
whether and to what degree people are unable to refrain 
from acting.  Neither in psychology, philosophy, nor folk 
psychology is there a reasonably uncontroversial
understanding of these matters.381
378. Id. at 376.
379. Id. at 362 (majority opinion).
380. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 419 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
381. Stephen J. Morse, Causation, Compulsion, and Involuntariness, 22 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 159, 177 (1994).
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Similarly, Professor Richard Bonnie has stated:
There is, in short, no objective basis for distinguishing 
between offenders who were undeterrable and those who 
were merely undeterred, between the impulse that was 
irresistible and the impulse not resisted, or between
substantial impairment of capacity and some lesser
impairment.  Whatever the precise terms of the volitional
test, the question is unanswerable—or can be answered 
only by “moral guesses.”382
And Professor Paul Robinson has stated:
No test is available to distinguish between those who
cannot and those who will not conform to legal
requirements.  The result is an invitation to semantic 
jousting, metaphysical speculation and intuitive moral
judgments masked as factual determinations.383
As the American Psychiatric Association has observed, “the line 
between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is 
probably no sharper than that between twilight and dusk.”384
Professor Eric Janus has written that “there is good evidence that 
the inability-to-control concept lacks substance.”385  Because of 
these difficulties, Congress abandoned the “control prong” of the 
ALI test386 in the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984,387 and many 
states that had adopted some version of that test have abandoned it 
as well.388
382. H.R. REP. NO 98-1030, at 226-27 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3408-09 (quoting Professor Richard J. Bonnie).
383. Id. (quoting Professor Paul H. Robinson).
384. Id. at 228, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3410.
385. Eric S. Janus, Sex Offender Commitments and the “Inability to Control”—
Developing Legal Standards and a Behaviorial Vocabulary for an Elusive Concept, in 2 
THE SEXUAL PREDATOR 1-1, 1-2 (Anita Schlank ed., 2001); see also Janus, Lessons,
supra note 324, at 14 (“the conventional wisdom is that ‘inability to control’ is a 
highly confused concept with little or no meaningful content”).  But Professor 
Janus’ position on this point has been inconsistent.  At the same time he was 
making these assertions, he was arguing on behalf of Linehan that inability to 
control was the only constitutionally sufficient standard. See In re Linehan (Linehan
III), 557 N.W.2d 171, 185 (Minn. 1996), vacated and remanded, 522 U.S. 1011 
(1997), aff’d as modified, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999).
386. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 401(1) (“A person is not responsible for criminal 
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he 
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”).
387. See Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, Tit. II, ch. IV, § 402(a), 98 
Stat. 2057 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 17).
388. 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 173 & nn. 2, 4, 56.5 (1984 
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The only explanation Justice Breyer offered for the inability-to-
control requirement is that it is necessary to distinguish the person 
subject to commitment from mere criminals:
We do not agree with the State, however, insofar as it 
seeks to claim that the Constitution permits commitment 
of the type of dangerous sexual offender considered in 
Hendricks without any lack-of-control determination.
Hendricks underscored the constitutional importance of 
distinguishing a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil 
commitment “from other dangerous persons who are 
perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through 
criminal proceedings.”  That distinction is necessary lest 
“civil commitment” become a “mechanism for retribution 
or general deterrence”—functions properly those of
criminal law, not civil commitment.389
While this explanation may vaguely explain the Court’s desire 
to identify some limiting standard, it provides no justification for 
the inability-to-control standard as opposed to some other limiting 
standard.390
The better explanation may be contained in Justice Thomas’
majority opinion for the Court in Hendricks.  He explained that 
persons whose mental disorders prevent them from exercising 
adequate control over their behavior “are therefore unlikely to be 
deterred by the threat of confinement.”391  However, as
Justice Thomas made clear by joining the dissenting opinion in 
Crane, he had referred to inability to control only in the sense that 
the person engages in his harmful acts because of his mental 
disorder.392
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not been specific about the 
purpose of the mental disorder requirement in constitutional 
analysis, in Linehan III the Minnesota Supreme Court suggested two 
purposes served by this requirement.  First, the court said the 
mental disorder requirement helps to assess risk of dangerous 
& Supp. 1999-2000). See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-6 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 
2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 39 (West 1983 & Supp. 2002); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 14-24-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEX. PENAL  § 8.01 (1994).
389. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002).
390. Janus, Constitutional, supra note 329, at 414 (stating that, in Hendricks, the 
“Court did not explain why it focused on this sort of dysfunction or how this 
dysfunction serves to limit and justify civil commitment”).
391. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362-63 (1997).
392. Crane, 534 U.S. at 420-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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behavior.393  Second, the court held that the requirement of a 
mental disorder served the State’s interest in providing intensive 
treatment for sex offenders, rather than simply extending criminal 
sentences.394
One thing that is clear is that neither the U.S. nor the
Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted Professor Janus’ oft-
repeated argument that sexual predators can be civilly committed 
only if they lack criminal responsibility, i.e., are criminally insane.395
Both Hendricks and Crane had been previously criminally
convicted for their sexual offenses.396  Yet, there is no suggestion in 
either decision that, because the two men had been held criminally 
responsible for their acts, they could not be civilly committed.  Had 
the Court even entertained this possibility, surely the issue would 
have been discussed; if the view had been adopted, each of the 
decisions would have come out the opposite way.
The Minnesota Supreme Court expressly rejected the criminal-
non-responsibility argument in Linehan III,397 and the court’s
decision in Linehan IV (upholding Linehan’s commitment despite 
the fact he was criminally responsible) necessarily reaffirmed that 
holding.398  Justice Simonett, writing for the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in Blodgett, discussed the court’s reasons for rejecting the 
dichotomous either-criminally-responsible-or-civilly-committable
argument:
Is it better for a person with an uncontrollable sex drive to 
be given an enhanced prison sentence or to be committed 
393. In re Linehan (Linehan III), 557 N.W.2d 171, 186-87 (Minn 1996), vacated
and remanded, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997), aff’d as modified, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 
1999).  As Professor Janus stated in a related context: “The expert’s prediction 
takes the following form: this patient’s illness has caused dangerousness in the 
past; the illness continues; therefore, this patient’s dangerousness continues.”
ERIC S. JANUS, CIVIL COMMITMENT IN MINNESOTA 45 (2d ed. 1991).  Without 
referring to his own previous statement, Professor Janus has recently written that 
mental disorder is at best a modest predictor of dangerousness. See Eric S. Janus, 
Foreshadowing the Future of Kansas v. Hendricks: Lessons from Minnesota’s Sex Offender 
Commitment Litigation, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1279, 1296-99 (1998) [hereinafter Janus, 
Foreshadowing].
394. Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 187.
395. See, e.g., id. (describing the argument before the Minnesota Supreme 
Court); Janus, Lessons, supra note 324, at 14-15.
396. Crane, 534 U.S. at 411 (majority opinion), 872 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 353-54.
397. Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 183-84.
398. In re Linehan (Linehan IV), 594 N.W.2d 867, 876 (Minn. 1999), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1049 (1999).
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civilly?  .  . .  For the legislature which must provide the 
necessary prison cells or hospital beds, there are no easy 
answers.  Nor are there easy answers for society which, 
ultimately, must decide to what extent criminal blame is 
to be assigned to people who are what they are.
. . . .
In the present imperfect state of scientific knowledge, 
where there are no definitive answers, it would seem a 
state legislature should be allowed, constitutionally, to 
choose either or both alternatives for dealing with the 
sexual predator.399
C. State Courts Are Split Regarding Whether Crane Requires A 
Finding Or Jury Instruction Expressly Addressing Inability To 
Control
As discussed above, the Minnesota courts and the Eighth
Circuit have read Crane to require an express finding of some level 
of inability to control behavior.  This has not, however, been
obvious to all courts that have examined the issue.  Since Crane was
decided, courts in ten states (besides Minnesota) have addressed 
whether Crane requires that there be a court finding or jury 
instruction expressly addressing inability to control.  In most of 
these states the commitments followed jury trials in which the jury 
instructions did not contain express mention of inability to control.
Committed persons in these states have therefore demanded that 
their commitments be overturned and that they receive new trials 
at which the inability-to-control issue would be specifically
addressed.
At this writing, it appears that two (maybe three) state supreme 
courts and the intermediate appellate court of one additional state 
have required an express finding or jury instruction addressing 
Crane’s serious-difficulty-in-controlling-behavior holding.400  These 
399. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 917-18 (Minn. 1994).
400. See In re Barnes, No. 01-1545, 2003 WL 152308 (Iowa Jan. 23, 2003) 
(reversing commitment under statute similar to Kansas statute because jury
instruction did not expressly address inability to control); In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 
789 (Mo. 2002) (same); Spink v. Washington, 48 P.3d 381 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) 
(same).  It is unclear whether a decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court also 
falls into this group.  In In re W.Z., 801 A.2d 205 (N.J. 2002), the court remanded
the case to the trial court, in a non-jury case, for additional findings based on the 
state court’s reading of Crane.  However, the court in W.Z. also interpreted the 
statute to contain a highly-likely-to-reoffend requirement.  It appears that the 
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courts have remanded cases where the necessary jury instructions 
were not given or findings were not made.
On the other hand, four state supreme courts and the
appellate courts of two other states have held that Crane does not
require a jury instruction expressly addressing inability to control.401
These decisions acknowledged the Crane requirement that there be 
“proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior,” but held that 
such a finding is implicit in the states’ commitment criteria (which, 
in each case, were essentially identical to the requirements of the 
Kansas act at issue in Crane).  The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
explained in In re Laxton:
We conclude that the required proof of lack of control, 
therefore, may be established by evidence of the
individual’s mental disorder and requisite level of
dangerousness, which together distinguish a dangerous 
sexual offender who has serious difficulty controlling his 
or her behavior from a dangerous but typical recidivist.
Wisconsin ch. 980 satisfies this due process requirement 
because the statute requires a nexus between the mental 
disorder and the individual’s dangerousness.  Proof of this 
nexus necessarily and implicitly involves proof that the 
person’s mental disorder involves serious difficulty for the 
person to control his or her behavior.  The definition of a 
sexually violent person requires, in part, that the
individual is “dangerous because he or she suffers from a 
mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the
person will engage in acts of sexual violence.”402
Will the U.S. Supreme Court resolve this split between the 
state courts regarding the meaning of Crane?  Perhaps the Court is 
weary of this issue.  It has already denied a certiorari petition in one 
case, In re Laxton, even though there were squarely conflicting state 
court may have been saying that Crane’s serious-difficulty-in-controlling
requirement was implicit in the statutory commitment criteria, similar to the cases 
discussed below, but that the remand was necessary because the court had gleaned 
the “highly likely” requirement from Crane.
401. See In re Leon G., 59 P.3d 779 (Ariz. 2002); Westerheide v. State, 831 
So. 2d 93 (Fla. 2002); In re Luckabaugh, 568 S.E.2d 338 (S.C. 2002); In re Laxton, 
647 N.W.2d 784 (Wisc. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 870 (2003); People v. Williams, 
120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), review granted (Cal. July 17, 2002); People 
v. Wollschlager, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), review granted (Cal. 
Oct. 16, 2002); People v. Hancock, 771 N.E.2d 459 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), appeal
denied (Ill. Oct. 2, 2002).
402. Laxton, 647 N.W.2d at 793 (citing WIS STAT. § 980.01(7) (1999) (emphasis 
added)) (footnote omitted).
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supreme court decisions.403
D. What Constitutes Inability to Control?
If a State must specifically prove “serious difficulty in
controlling behavior,” or a similar standard, what kind of evidence
is sufficient to meet this standard?  Because Minnesota has been 
operating under an inability-to-control standard for many years, 
Minnesota (unlike most states) has actually compiled a body of case 
law applying an inability-to-control standard.404
1. Development of an inability to control standard
Of course, the simplest type of inability to control is presented 
by Hendricks. Hendricks stated that he wished to avoid further 
molestation of children, but that he “c[ould]n’t control the urge” 
to do so; he said that only his own death would stop him from 
molesting children.405  The Supreme Court in Crane later described 
Hendricks’ condition as a volitional disability,406 apparently referring
to situations where the person wishes to avoid the harmful
behavior, but has such strong urges, such low impulse control, or a 
combination of the two, that he is unable to do so.  Hendricks’ 
condition, the Court said, “involves what a lay person might
describe as a lack of control.”407
In Minnesota, a similar scenario frequently found to
demonstrate inability to control is repeated sexual assault without 
apparent regard for the consequences.  As a dramatic example, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals described the acts of Robert Kunshier, 
403. See Laxton v. Wisconsin, 123 S. Ct. 870 (2003) (denying certiorari).  When 
the order denying certiorari in Laxton was issued on January 13, 2003, the Missouri
Supreme Court’s decision in Thomas conflicted with the Wisconsin, Arizona,
Florida and South Carolina supreme court decisions cited in note 400, above.  The 
Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Barnes, agreeing with Thomas and disagreeing 
with Laxton, Leon G., Westerheide and Luckabaugh, was issued subsequently on 
January 23, 2003.
404. E.g., Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915; In re Linehan (Linehan I), 518 N.W.2d 
609, 614 (Minn. 1994); State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 555, 
287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 270 (1940); In re Preston, 629 N.W.2d 
104, 111 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); In re Irwin, 592 N.W.2d 366, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995); In re Pirkl, 531 N.W.2d 902, 905 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); In re Bieganowski, 
520 N.W.2d 525, 530 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); In re Schweninger, 520 N.W.2d 446, 
460 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). See also Kirwin, Overview, supra note 10, at 4-13 & 17-18.
405. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355.
406. Crane, 534 U.S. at 414.
407. Id.
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noting that he had committed
some of these acts while on probation, after escaping from 
custody, and during or after completing sex offender 
programming.  His assaults have been committed within a 
day or a week of being released from or escaping from 
custody . . . . He rapes while actively fleeing pursuing
peace officers.  His sexual impulses override any normal 
fear of capture or consequences . . . .408
But the U.S. Supreme Court in Crane emphasized that it was 
not limiting inability to control to volitional impairments: “Nor, 
when considering civil commitment, have we ordinarily
distinguished for constitutional purposes among volitional,
emotional, and cognitive impairments.”409  The Court said that it 
did not decide, either in Hendricks or Crane, whether commitment 
based only on “emotional” abnormality would be constitutional.410
The Crane Court’s discussion of “volitional,” “cognitive” and 
“emotional” disorders is obscure.411  The Kansas statute at issue in 
Crane provided that the mental disorder element could be satisfied 
by a “mental abnormality or personality disorder.”412  “Mental 
abnormality” was defined, in part, as a “condition affecting the 
emotional or volitional capacity” of the person.413  The term
“personality disorder” was not further defined.414  The Kansas 
Supreme Court concluded that only “volitional” impairment could 
include an inability to control, and the volitional impairment must 
include “capacity involving the exercise of will.”415  This type of 
impairment has been described as “ego-dystonic;” the person’s 
“higher self” struggling against his urges, or “lower self.” 416
At the U.S. Supreme Court, the State of Kansas argued
strenuously that the Kansas Supreme Court had erred, both by 
408. In re Kunshier, No. C7-95-1490, 1995 WL 687692, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Nov. 21, 1995).
409. Crane, 534 U.S. at 415.
410. Id.
411. See generally id. at 408.
412. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 289 (Kan. 2000) (quoting KANS. STAT. ANN. § 59-
29a02(a) (Supp. 1999)).
413. Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (Supp. 1999)).
414. Id. at 289.
415. Id.
416. Eric S. Janus, Sex Offender Commitments: Debunking the Official Narrative and 
Revealing the Rules-in-Use, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y. REV. 71, 81 (1997).  Like the Kansas 
Supreme Court, Janus argued that only volitional impairment should qualify for 
commitment. Id. at 76.
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requiring specific proof of inability to control and by holding that 
only a “volitional,” as opposed to an “emotional,” impairment could 
qualify for commitment.417  The State’s brief pointed out that the 
inability-to-control standard would not apply even to persons whose 
dangerous acts resulted from schizophrenia or other serious
psychoses.418  Similarly, an amicus brief explained that a complete-
lack-of-control standard would not apply “even to the most
delusional and psychotic people.”419  Both briefs quoted a journal 
article stating that, “as [Stephen] Morse and others have shown, 
even the most severely crazy people usually intend their acts and 
therefore have some control over them.”420
The point that Kansas and the amicus were making was that 
the inability-to-control test could not be universally applied to civil 
commitment standards, because most traditional mental illness 
commitments would not qualify.  The typical mental illness
commitment does not involve a person who wants to avoid
particular conduct, but cannot control his urges.  Rather, it
generally involves delusions (e.g., the person acts defensively
because he thinks the victim is trying to harm him) or
hallucinations (e.g., God is telling the mentally ill person to kill or 
harm another person).421  In either case, the person willfully acts 
(albeit in response to impaired thought processes), rather than 
succumbing to irresistible urges.  The Crane Court’s reference to 
“cognitive” and “emotional” impairments apparently referred to 
this issue.422  The Court said:
Hendricks must be read in context.  The Court did not 
draw a clear distinction between the purely “emotional” 
sexually related mental abnormality and the “volitional.”
Here, as in other areas of psychiatry, there may be
“considerable overlap between a . . . defective
417. Petitioner’s Brief at 11, 21, 25, Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (No. 
00-957) (available at 2001 WL 674238).
418. Reply Brief at 6, Crane (No. 00-957) (available at 2001 WL 991493).
419. Brief of Amicus Curiae Ass’n for Treatment of Sexual Abusers [“ATSA”] 
at 3, Crane (No. 00-957) (available at 2001 WL 670067).
420. Reply Brief at 6, Crane (No. 00-957); Brief of Amicus Curiae ATSA at 3, 
Crane (No. 00-957) (quoting Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the 
Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1238 (2000)).
421. See, e.g., In re Clemons, 494 N.W.2d 519, 520 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) 
(describing how woman beat two-year-old grandson unconscious, trying to “drive 
out the demons”); In re Miner, 411 N.W.2d 525, 526 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) 
(describing how man killed father, under delusion that father was “the enemy”).
422. See Crane, 534 U.S. at 408.
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understanding or appreciation and . . . [an] ability to 
control . . . behavior.”423
Minnesota SPP and SDP cases have generally not involved 
psychotic persons with delusions or hallucinations.  However, many 
of these cases have involved persons who did not have the “will” to 
avoid committing sexually predatory acts, but rather chose to
commit those acts due to their “defective appreciation or
understanding” of the nature or harmfulness of their acts.  Merlin 
Adolphson, for example, was a pedophile who engaged in sexual 
activity with adolescent boys.424  Adolphson did not wish to refrain 
from sexual contact with the children; to the contrary, his
pedophilia involved the entrenched belief that sex with children 
was acceptable, even beneficial, to them.425  The Minnesota Court 
of Appeals noted that Adolphson “ha[d] no will to stop sexually 
assaulting adolescent males,” but concluded that this did not 
preclude a finding of inability to control: “This complete lack of 
will shows he continues to have an utter lack of power of control.”426
Crane appears to contemplate the commitment of such persons, 
and not to limit “serious difficulty in controlling behavior” to those 
persons who experience an ego-dystonic struggle between their will 
and their urges.427
2. Personality Disorders
One type of mental disorder that has provoked debate as a 
basis for sexual predator commitment is the “personality disorder.”
Most of the recent sexual predator commitment statutes specifically 
list “personality disorder” as one type of disorder that will support 
commitment.428  A personality disorder “is an enduring pattern of 
inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the 
expectations of the individual’s culture, is pervasive and inflexible, 
has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over time, 
and leads to distress or impairment.”429  In Minnesota, the two types 
of personality disorders most often involved in SPP and SDP
423. Id. at 415 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
424. In re Adolphson, No. C5-95-533, 1995 WL 434386 (Minn. Ct. App. July 25, 
1995).
425. Id. at *3-4.
426. Id. at *4.
427. See generally Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 407 (2002).
428. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (2001); MINN. STAT. § 253B.02,
subd. 18c(a)(2) (2002).
429. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 63, at 685.
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commitment cases are “antisocial personality disorder” and
“narcissistic personality disorder.”430  These two disorders share 
some characteristics related to sex offending, particularly the
inability to experience empathy towards others and the tendency to 
exploit others for one’s self-gratification.431
The antisocial personality disorder, in particular, is sometimes 
criticized as a basis for a sexual predator commitment on the basis 
that it simply characterizes a history of bad behavior.432  This 
disorder, sometimes referred to as “psychopathy,”433 is described 
generally as “a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, 
the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence 
and continues into adulthood.”434  Extreme callousness and lack of 
empathy or remorse are central features of the disorder.435  The 
American Psychiatric Association’s diagnostic manual, DSM-IV-TR,
provides for the diagnosis of this mental disorder primarily through 
a defined set of behaviors.436  If this behavioral pattern is present, 
the “Antisocial Personality Disorder is diagnosed because a
psychological dysfunction can then reasonably be inferred.”437
In situations where significant consequences may attach to the 
diagnosis of “psychopathy,” however, most experts now use a more-
focused set of criteria developed by Dr. Robert Hare called the 
Psychopathy Checklist–Revised, or PCL-R.438  The PCL-R, better 
than DSM’s diagnostic criteria, identifies persons who exhibit the 
primary mental features of a psychopath—callousness and lack of 
empathy or remorse.439  Researchers believe that psychopaths, as 
430. See, e.g., In re Linehan (Linehan III), 557 N.W.2d 171, 184-85 (Minn. 
1996), vacated and remanded, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997), aff’d as modified, 594 N.W.2d
867 (Minn. 1999) (antisocial personality disorder); In re Poole, No. C8-00-171,
2000 WL 781381, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 2000) (narcissistic personality 
disorder); DSM-IV-TR, supra note 63, at 701-06 (describing antisocial personality
disorder) and 714-17 (describing narcissistic personality disorder).
431. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 63, at 703, 705, 714-15.
432. Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 184 (describing Linehan’s argument).
433. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 63, at 702.
434. Id. at 701.
435. Id. at 702-03.
436. Id. at 706.
437. Robert L. Spitzer & Janet B. W. Williams, The Definition and Diagnosis of 
Mental Disorder, in DEVIANCE AND MENTAL ILLNESS 15, 21 (W. R. Gove ed., 1982).
438. Heather M. Gretten et al., Psychopathy and Recidivism in Adolescent Sex 
Offenders, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 427, 427-28 (2001); Robert D. Hare, Psychopathy:
A Clinical Construct Whose Time Has Come, 23 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 25 (1996); Grant 
T. Harris et al., Criminal Violence: The Roles of Psychopathy, Neurodevelopmental Insults, 
and Antisocial Parenting, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 402, 406 (2001).
439. Harris, supra note 438, at 406; Stephen D. Hart et al., The Psychopathy 
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measured by the PCL-R, make up a group that is qualitatively 
distinct from other violent offenders.440
As it relates to civil commitment of sexual predators,
psychopathy is much more than just another description of the 
person’s past misdeeds.  It serves two significant purposes.  First, it 
helps to separate out those persons most likely to commit new sex 
offenses.  Psychopathy, at least as measured by the PCL-R, has been 
shown to be a helpful predictor of sexual (as well as violent) 
recidivism.441
Second, it identifies a group of persons who are not adequately 
addressed through the criminal justice system.  In Hendricks, the 
Supreme Court observed that persons whose mental disorders 
prevent them from exercising adequate control over their behavior 
“are therefore unlikely to be deterred by the threat of
confinement.”442  Researchers have found that psychopaths in
particular exhibit this characteristic: they have marked deficits in 
the ability to learn from, or be deterred by, the prospect of
punishment or other aversive stimuli.443  Thus, to the extent the 
purpose of the Supreme Court’s inability-to-control requirement is 
to distinguish persons subject to commitment from persons more 
properly addressed through the criminal system, psychopathy
serves that purpose as effectively as many other mental disorders: it 
identifies persons whom the criminal system is unlikely to deter 
from committing future sexual assaults.
VII. ONE ARROW IN THE QUIVER—A NECESSARY COMPONENT OF A 
STATE’S RESPONSE TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE
For various reasons, many people are uncomfortable with the 
idea of civilly committing sexual predators.  But for governmental 
decision makers, using civil commitment within constitutional 
bounds may be the only responsible decision.
As explained earlier, in 1988 through 1991, Minnesota policy 
Checklist–Revised (PCL-R): An Overview for Researchers and Clinicians, in 8 ADVANCES IN 
PSYCH. ASSESSMENT 103, 105-06 (James C. Rosen & Paul McReynolds eds. 1992); 
Thomas A. Widiger et al., DSM-IV Antisocial Personality Disorder Field Trial, 105 J. 
ABNORMAL PSYCH. 3, 4 (1996).
440. Harris, supra note 438, at 406.
441. Gretten, supra note 438, at 429-30; Hare, supra note 438, at 44.
442. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362-63 (1997).
443. Robert F. Schopp & Andrew J. Slain, Psychopathy, Criminal Responsibility, 
and Civil Commitment as a Sexual Predator, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 247, 252, 258-61
(2000) (discussing research and hypotheses of reasons for this deficit).
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makers were confronted with several rape-murders committed by 
repeat sex offenders recently released from prison.444  Under 
Minnesota’s determinate sentencing system, similar to sentencing 
systems now commonly used across the country, these persons were 
absolutely entitled to be released from prison, irrespective of the 
well-founded views of prison officials that they remained highly 
dangerous.445  Intensive post-release correctional supervision is only 
a partial—and often unsuccessful—answer.
The criminal-justice system can protect members of the public 
from such a person only after the person has committed additional 
offenses.  One of the most liberal members of the Minnesota 
Legislature responded to the argument by Professor Janus that the 
Legislature should take the “just convict them for their next crime” 
approach: “And now I think, if we follow your logic, we just have to 
let them go and do it again and have another person victimized 
before we can take any action.  That’s a very difficult thing for us to 
explain or to justify.”446  This is not simply an expedient “political” 
response to the issue: it should be hard for public officials to justify
failing to protect the public—standing by and permitting serious 
sexual victimization of many women and children—when the 
officials have the constitutional means to prevent such harm.
Currenty, there are approximately 195 persons committed as 
SPP, SDP, or both, who are not also held under criminal
sentences.447  It is appropriate—not sensational—to look at the past 
sexual assault victims of these persons who are currently committed 
to quantify the harm that has been prevented by their
commitment.  It is appropriate to look not only at the sexual 
assault/murder victims of persons like Dennis Linehan and Clark 
Bailey,448 but also at the countless women and children who
survived the devastation of rape or other sexual abuse and whose 
lives are irreparably changed by the acts of these two men and 
other committed persons.  Richard Enebak, for example, left the 
last of his at-least-thirty-seven sexual assault victims permanently 
444. See supra Part II.D.
445. MINN. STAT. §§ 244.01-244.11 (2002).
446. Proposed Language of the Task Force on Sexual Predators: House Judiciary, Senate 
Judiciary, and Senate Crime Prevention Committees, 78th Minn. Leg. (Aug. 24, 1994) 
(statement of Sen. Allan Spear).
447. Telephone conversation with Anita Schlank, Clinical Director, Minnesota 
Sex Offender Program (Mar. 12, 2003).
448. In re Linehan (Linehan I), 518 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1994); Bailey v. 
Noot, 324 N.W.2d 164, 165 (Minn. 1982).
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paralyzed.449  In one of Donald Martenies’ sexual assaults, he spread 
his seven-year-old stepdaughter’s legs with such force that he tore 
her vaginal area; he then tied her to a table and sewed up the tear 
without anesthesia.450  Clear and convincing evidence showed that 
these committed persons were likely to repeat such sexual assaults 
if not confined and treated.
So why is the policy decision not an easy one?  Why do some 
persons still have concerns?
A. Reliance Solely on Criminal Justice System is Inadequate
Many concerns have been raised.  One is that it is dangerous to 
depart from the primacy of the criminal justice system as society’s 
means of confining persons to prevent serious future harm.451
Those opposing civil commitment of sexual predators generally 
profess not to oppose lengthy, even life, sentences for serious 
repeat sex offenders.452  So the question may be asked whether 
Minnesota has made maximum, reasonable, use of the criminal-
justice system.
Since Minnesota adopted its system of fixed criminal sentences 
twenty-three years ago,453 the Legislature has frequently revisited 
the subject of criminal sentences for sex offenders.  It has increased 
sex offender sentences generally and has provided enhanced
sentencing options for sex offenders who have particularly serious 
offense histories or are assessed to be the most dangerous.454
449. Enebak v. Noot, 353 N.W.2d 544, 545-46 (Minn. 1984).
450. In re Martenies, 350 N.W.2d 470, 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
451. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82 (1992); Janus, Lessons, supra 
note 324, at 12-13.  The Foucha court stated that
the State does not explain why its interest would not be vindicated by 
the ordinary criminal processes involving charge and conviction, the 
use of enhanced sentences for recidivists, and other permissible ways of 
dealing with patterns of criminal conduct.  These are the normal 
means of dealing with persistent criminal conduct.
504 U.S. at 82.
452. See, e.g., Erlinder, supra note 285, at 158-59.
453. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 723, art. 1, 1978 Minn. Laws 761, 762-70.
454. Act of May 17, 2002, ch. 381, § 2, 2002 Minn. Laws 942, 942 (increasing 
presumptive guidelines sentence for second-degree criminal sexual conduct); Act 
of May 29, 2001, ch. 210, § 24, 2001 Minn. Laws 878, 897 (mandating assessment
of offender by Minnesota Security Hospital before sentencing any repeat felony 
sex offender); Act of Apr. 3, 2000, ch. 311, art. 4, § 2, 2000 Minn. Laws 185, 211 
(increasing presumptive guidelines sentence for first-degree criminal sexual
conduct); Act of May 25, 1995, ch. 226, art. 2, §§ 12-13, 1995 Minn. Laws 1753, 
1785 (increasing statutory maximum in patterned sex offender cases and
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Following statutory changes in 2001 and 2002, the presumptive 
guideline sentences for first- and second-degree criminal sexual 
conduct are executed sentences of twelve years and seven and one-
half years, respectively.455  Offenders determined to be “patterned 
sex offenders” according to a statutory definition must be given a 
sentence of at least double the presumptive sentence and up to 
forty years.456  Certain repeat sex offenders must be given executed 
sentences of life, thirty years, or double the presumptive guidelines
sentence, depending on the category into which the offender 
falls.457
Returning to a system of indeterminate sentences, perhaps 
even indeterminate life sentences, for some or all sex offenders has 
been considered as an option but has been rejected for several
reasons.458  Chief among these is the concern that, if criminal 
sexual conduct convictions carried extremely long or lifetime
indeterminate sentences, accused persons would seldom be willing 
to plead guilty to a sex offense, but would be willing to plead guilty 
to other offenses not covered by the indeterminate sentences.459
Sex offenses almost always involve other crimes, such as assault, 
kidnapping or false imprisonment (even though such offenses are 
not always charged).  For example, although Dennis Linehan killed 
the young babysitter he was attempting to rape in his most
increasing scope of statute); Act of May 10, 1994, ch. 636, art. 2, § 16, 1994 Minn. 
Laws 2170, 2197-98 (making consideration of patterned sex offender sentencing 
mandatory in cases of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct); Act of 
Apr. 29, 1992, ch. 571, art. 1, §§ 11, 14, 15, 22-24, 1992 Minn. Laws 1983, 1990-95,
2000-02 (making patterned sex offender sentence mandatory, increasing
maximum sentences and adding mandatory life, thirty-year and double-
presumptive sentences for certain sex offenders); Act of June 1, 1989, ch. 290,
art. 2, § 14 and art. 4, §§ 10, 12-15, 1989 Minn. Laws 1580, 1593-94, 1620-23
(enacting patterned sex offender law, increasing maximum sentences for criminal 
sexual conduct and thirty-seven-year sentence for some third-time sex offenders).
See also Act of Apr. 9, 1998, ch. 367, art. 6, § 5, 1998 Minn. Laws 666, 727-29
(recodifying patterned sex offender, life and mandatory-thirty-year sentence
statutes).
455. See Act of May 17, 2002, ch. 381, § 2, 2002 Minn. Laws 942, 942 (codified 
at MINN. STAT. §§ 609.342, subd. 2(b) and 609.343, subd. 2(b) (2002)); Act of 
Apr. 3, 2000, ch. 311, art. 4, § 2, 2000 Minn. Laws 185, 211.  As explained earlier,
offenders serve at least two-thirds of their pronounced sentence in prison; prison 
time may be increased somewhat for loss of “good time” due to prison discipline.
MINN. STAT. § 244.04 (2002).
456. MINN. STAT. § 609.108 (2002).
457. MINN. STAT. § 609.109 (2002).
458. DOC CIV. COMMIT. STUDY, supra note 42, at 24.
459. Id.
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notorious offense, he actually pled guilty only to a kidnapping 
charge.460  Thus, a statute providing indeterminate sentences for 
persons convicted of sex offenses would not have applied to him.
For a variety of reasons, prosecutors are likely to accept guilty pleas 
to non-sex crimes in many or most of these cases, rather than 
having to go to trial in essentially all sex offense cases.  Prosecutors 
not only face great caseload pressures, but also must consider the 
potential psychological harm to victim witnesses in sex offense 
cases.  Moreover, in deciding whether to accept a guilty plea only to 
a non-sex charge, the prosecutor may not have a complete history 
of the offender’s charged and uncharged offenses or his complete 
treatment history.  Indeterminate sentences for sex offenses,
therefore, are unlikely to be a significant solution for the danger 
posed by repeat sex offenders.  In addition, Minnesota officials are 
reluctant to revert to an indeterminate sentencing system, even a 
partial one, because the system of determinate sentences is widely 
regarded as superior to the previous system.461
Minnesota officials have taken several hard looks at the
criminal sentencing system.  The Legislature must consider not 
only the practical issues discussed above, but also the integrity of 
the criminal justice system.  As the Minnesota Supreme Court 
noted in Blodgett, “there are no easy answers”462 to the question of 
the allocation of the public protection function between the 
criminal and civil systems: “The concern with enhanced criminal 
punishment on the basis of dangerousness is that the punishment 
may tend to become divorced from moral blameworthiness.”463
Moreover, while the Minnesota Department of Corrections
(“DOC”) has provided sex offender treatment in prison for many 
years,464 the Legislature and DOC have recently taken additional 
steps to enable and encourage prisoners to make the best use of 
their prison time so that they may avoid or shorten the term of civil 
commitment.465  Under this program, DOC is evaluating and
460. In re Linehan (Linehan I), 518 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1994).
461. DOC CIV. COMMIT. STUDY, supra note 42, at 24.
462. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn. 1994).
463. Id. at 918 n.16.
464. PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV., OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, STATE OF
MINN., SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAMS 46 (1994).
465. Act of Apr. 7, 2000, ch. 359, § 1, 2000 Minn. Laws 381, 381-83; MINN.
DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, SEX OFFENDER POLICY AND MANAGEMENT BOARD STUDY 13
(2000) [hereinafter DOC SEX OFFENDER POLICY STUDY]; Anita Schlank & Rick 
Harry, The Treatment of the Civilly Committed Sex Offender in Minnesota: A Review of the 
Past Ten Years, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1236 (2003); Stephen J. Huot, Sex Offender
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notifying prisoners at the beginning of their prison terms that they 
may be candidates for SPP/SDP commitment.466  DOC then
provides them the opportunity and substantial inducement to 
participate while imprisoned in the most-intensive sex offender 
treatment the State has to offer—the same Department of Human 
Services-run program provided to civilly committed persons.467  In 
his dissent in Hendricks, Justice Breyer suggested that a non-punitive
state commitment program should attempt to provide available 
treatment at the earliest possible stage.468  Minnesota’s treatment 
efforts, particularly with the recent refinements, are certainly
consistent with that observation.
Minnesota policy makers obviously believe that they have
increased criminal sentences for sex offenders as far as is legitimate 
and feasible within the context of Minnesota’s sentencing system.
As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted in Blodgett, that decision is 
for the legislative branch.469  Further, it also seems clear that the 
recent combined efforts of the Departments of Corrections and 
Human Services are designed to maximize the use of prison time to 
provide treatment in prison, rather than through civil commitment 
following release from prison.
B. Other Policy Arguments Against Civil Commitment Are 
Unsupported
Professor Janus has argued that civil commitment of sexual 
predators is the first step down a slippery slope—that “[l]egitimate 
concerns for public safety will combine with sensational media 
coverage to produce intense political pressure to expand this new 
use of civil commitment” into other areas.470  This appears to be 
boxing with shadows.  Despite the increased use of civil
commitment to address problems of sexual predators over the last 
thirteen years, there has been no attempt to use this process more 
generally to address other criminal behavior.  Prosecutors and 
legislators did not concoct the notion that sexual predators are 
Policy and Management Board Study, in IV SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITIES AND 
SEXUALLY DANGEROUS PERSONS 9, 11 (Minn. Inst. of Legal Educ. 2001).
466. Schlank & Harry, supra note 465, at 1236-37; Huot, supra note 465, at 9, 
11.
467. Huot, supra note 465, at 9, 11; DOC SEX OFFENDER POLICY STUDY, supra
note 465, at 13.
468. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 385-86 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
469. 510 N.W.2d at 917-18.
470. Janus, Constitutional, supra note 329, at 415.
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properly viewed as subjects of treatment and a mental-health-type
system.  At least as far back as Pearson and in the period before the 
increased use of PP commitments in 1990, the mental health 
system regarded sex offenders as patients and provided treatment 
programs for them.471  No basis has been shown to fear that civil 
commitment will begin to pervasively overlap the criminal system.
Opponents of civil commitment for this group also often argue 
that civil commitment is disingenuous because the state is claiming 
that commitment is for the purpose of treatment, while treatment 
for this group is difficult, at best.472  Under Minnesota’s
commitment act, persons committed as SPP and SDP, like all other 
committed persons, are entitled to be provided the best available 
treatment.473  But, in the legal defense of sexual predator
commitment, the State of Minnesota has not asserted that
commitment is primarily for the good of the patient or to provide 
treatment.  To the contrary, defending the constitutionality of the 
SDP law in Linehan III, the State told the Minnesota Supreme 
Court:
The purpose and effect of the law is readily
acknowledged.  First and foremost, it is to confine
disordered, sexually dangerous persons for the protection 
of society.
Second, it is the goal of the law to make treatment available to 
a person who must be confined under the law so he can 
“demonstrate that he has mastered his sexual impulses and is 
ready to take his place in society.”  No doubt, in most 
instances, the purpose of treatment is secondary to the 
purpose of confinement, i.e., if it were not necessary to confine 
471. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 n.12 (Minn. 1994) (describing
professional literature discussing treatment programs for sex offenders); Johnson, 
supra note 31, at 1142 (describing assumptions underlying enactment of PP
statute). The Minnesota Department of Human Services began the Intensive
Treatment Program for Sexual Aggressives, the predecessor to the current
Minnesota Sex Offender Program, in 1975, and also had a treatment program in 
place before that.  Anita Schlank, The Minnesota Sex Offender Program, in THE
SEXUAL PREDATOR 10-2 (Anita Schlank & Fred Cohen eds., 1999).
472. See, e.g., Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d 171, 199 (Minn. 1996) (Tomljanovich, J., 
dissenting), vacated and remanded, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997), aff’d as modified, 594 
N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999) (stating “only that the legislature’s reason for passing 
the SDP Act, once properly exposed under the spotlight of strict scrutiny, was not 
for the stated purpose of treatment, but for the actual purpose of detaining a 
person who frightens us” (emphasis in original)).
473. MINN. STAT. § 253B.03, subd. 7 (2002).
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the person for the protection of the public, the State would 
not confine the person simply for the treatment of his 
disorder.474
Minnesota’s description of the relative roles of public
protection and treatment, which seems obvious and indisputable, is 
precisely the view later validated by the Supreme Court in
Hendricks:
[T]he Kansas court’s determination that the Act’s
“overriding concern” was the continued “segregation of 
sexually violent offenders” is consistent with our
conclusion that the Act establishes civil proceedings,
especially when that concern is coupled with the State’s 
ancillary goal of providing treatment to those offenders, if 
such is possible.475
Thus, civil commitment of SDPs and SPPs, and the state’s
justification of it, are not disingenuous.
C. Janus’ Misallocation of Resources Argument—Good Question,
Flawed Analysis
Perhaps the most common, and most difficult, criticism of 
sexual predator commitment involves allocation of resources and 
the effectiveness of civil commitment in reducing sexual violence.
In his article in this issue, Professor Janus poses provocative
questions about whether civil commitment of sexual predators has 
a net positive or negative effect in reducing sexual violence and, 
even if the net effect is positive, whether more sexual violence 
would be prevented by spending some or all civil commitment 
dollars on other prevention measures.  As Janus acknowledges, of 
course, he comes to this debate as a defense attorney who for the 
past ten years has represented a particular individual seeking to 
avoid an SDP commitment.476
Janus’ misallocation argument asserts there is a limited pot of 
public money (apparently the amount currently being spent) to be 
used for measures to reduce sexual violence in Minnesota, and that 
public safety would be better served by transferring all or part of 
the money currently spent for sexual predator commitment to 
other sexual-violence-prevention programs.  Janus’ premise of a 
474. State’s Brief at 34, Linehan III (No. C1-95-2022) (citations omitted).
475. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997).
476. Janus has represented Dennis Linehan, a person ultimately committed as 
an SDP, in all of the Linehan cases cited in this article.
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fixed pot of money should not be accepted blindly.  It seems odd 
for an article advocating measures to reduce sexual violence to 
jump immediately to the argument that only the current level of 
funding is available, rather than first arguing for adequate funding 
to implement all sexual-violence-reduction measures that have a 
positive cost-benefit ratio.  That approach is more consistent with a 
goal of simply reducing or eliminating civil commitment than 
reducing sexual violence.
For policy makers, the first question should be whether the 
state’s civil commitment program, considered by itself, results in a 
net benefit — a decrease in the human suffering of the victims and 
avoidance of financial and other secondary costs due to sexual 
abuse.  (Among other things, sexual assault victims may require 
mental health counseling, may have a greater incidence of
chemical dependency, may abuse or neglect their own children, 
may sexually assault others, and may be less financially productive 
members of society than persons who have not been sexually 
assaulted.  In addition, sexual assault undermines the community’s 
sense of security.)  If it is concluded that there is a net benefit from 
civil commitment of sexual predators, policy makers must consider 
whether this benefit is sufficient to justify its cost: is it worth it to 
society to spend the money in this way and to prevent a repeat of 
the victimization perpetrated by the persons currently under
commitment, or would society prefer to have this money not 
collected in taxes?  To date, the Legislature and Governor have 
decided the civil commitment program is worth the cost.
Nevertheless, Janus is perhaps correct to suggest that the answer to 
this question not be taken for granted.
The other sexual-violence-prevention efforts suggested by
Janus also appear to be worthy.  However, each of these measures 
should be judged on its own merits; policy makers must determine 
whether each is sufficiently beneficial to merit the collection of tax 
revenues to support it.  At the point the Legislature and Governor 
decide not to fund a sexual-violence-reduction program, they are 
deciding, in effect, that the benefit of leaving that amount of 
money in the hands of taxpayers is greater than the benefit that 
would be achieved by spending the same amount on the sexual-
violence-reduction program.  The advocate for reduction of sexual 
violence would press policy makers to consider what Minnesotans 
will buy with their tax savings and whether the increase in quality of 
life or other benefit due to such tax savings outweighs the harm 
77
Kirwin: One Arrow in the Quiver—Using Civil Commitment as One Component o
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003
KIRWIN_FORMATTED 3/27/2003 11:47 PM
1212 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:4
that will be suffered by the children or women whose sexual assault 
or molestation could have been prevented and the other social 
costs—financial and otherwise—that will result from such assaults.
Janus’ allocation-of-resources argument appears to contain 
another erroneous premise.  He implies that Minnesota has
(thoughtlessly) elected civil commitment as the single approach to 
reducing the incidence of sexual violence, rather than considering 
and implementing the several other measures he suggests.  This 
gives insufficient credit to the Minnesota policy makers who have 
addressed these issues.  The 1989 Final Report of the Attorney 
General’s Task Force on the Prevention of Sexual Violence Against 
Women477 recommended many measures to reduce the incidence 
of sexual violence.  These included more vigorous prosecution and 
longer sentences for both adult and juvenile sex offenders;478
increased and more-intensive treatment for adult and juvenile sex 
offenders;479 more incentives for sex offenders to participate in 
treatment;480 more intensive supervision and treatment following 
release of sex offenders from jail or prison, including electronic 
monitoring;481 implementation of sexual violence prevention
curricula in schools;482 and intervention with young sexual
aggressors through child protection agencies.483  Many of these 
measures have been implemented.  The Task Force also
recommended increased use of civil commitment of sexual
predators,484 but this was only one of many recommendations for 
the reduction of the incidence of sexual violence.
Janus advances his misallocation-of-resources argument by
attempting a rough estimate of the annual number of sexual 
assaults that would be committed by the current group of civilly 
committed sexual predators, if not confined, and by comparing this 
number to a similarly rough estimate of the annual number of 
sexual assaults that are committed by sex offenders released from 
prison or released on probation.  This article does not attempt to 
critically examine Janus’ attempt to quantify the sexual assaults by
released persons who are not civilly committed.
477. ATT’Y GEN. REP., supra note 32.
478. Id. at 5-14.
479. Id. at 8-9, 16-17.
480. Id. at 19-20.
481. Id. at 18, 27.
482. Id. at 31-33.
483. Id. at 47-49.
484. Id. at 23.
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However, Janus’ estimate of the number of sexual assaults 
avoided annually due to the confinement of civilly committed 
persons is suspect.  He estimates that between six and twenty-three
sex crimes per year are prevented by having the current
commitment group of 190 persons confined in a treatment
facility.485  He arrives at this figure using a series of assumptions that 
range from questionable to indisputably wrong.
First, the merely questionable.  Janus attempts to determine an 
average sexual recidivism rate, or a range of such rates, to apply to 
the group of committed persons.486  He uses two separate
approaches to produce recidivism estimates.  One way he attempts 
to do this is to assume that, among the group of persons referred 
by the Department of Corrections to county attorneys for
consideration for commitment, the recidivism rate for the group of 
persons who are committed would be “roughly the same” as the 
group of referred persons who are not committed.487  But this 
assumption, rather than being facially sensible, is facially unsound.
County attorneys and courts review referred persons to separate 
those who meet commitment standards (including the
requirement that they be highly likely to sexually reoffend) from 
those who do not.  Janus seems to assume that courts and county 
attorneys make these decisions randomly, rather than by applying 
the commitment standards.  The far more sensible assumption is 
that the commitment group would have a higher recidivism rate
than the noncommitment group.
Moreover, Janus’ assumed six-year sex offense recidivism rate 
of eighteen percent for the noncommitted group is undoubtedly a 
substantial underestimate even for that group, due to the “vast 
underreporting” of sex offenses.488  Some researchers estimate that 
485. Eric C. Janus, Minnesota’s Sex Offender Commitment Program: Would an 
Empiracally-Based Prevention Policy be More Effective?, 29 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 1083, 
1102 (2003) [hereinafter Janus, Empiracally-Based Prevention Policy].
486. Id. at 1100.
487. Id. at 1094.  The Department of Corrections reports that about fifty 
percent of persons the Department refers for consideration for commitment are 
actually committed.  In about forty percent of the referrals the county attorney 
decides not to pursue commitment.  In the other ten percent, the county pursues 
commitment but the court denies the petition. DOC CIV. COMMIT. STUDY, supra
note 42, at 3.
488. See Lita Furby et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL.
3, 27 (1989); see also In re Linehan (Linehan III), 557 N.W.2d 171, 178 (Minn. 
1996), vacated and remanded, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997), aff’d as modified, 594 N.W.2d 
867 (Minn. 1999); Janice K. Marques et al., Effects of Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment 
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fewer than ten percent of sex offenses are reported;489 Janus himself 
asserts that only half of sexual assaults are reported, although he 
does not then apply this assumption to his presumed eighteen 
percent recidivism figure.490
Janus’ second method of attempting to estimate a recidivism 
figure is to make what he terms “a plausible argument” that the 
average recidivism rate for the group of committed persons does 
not exceed the highest-risk-group recidivism figures produced by 
various actuarial sex offender risk assessment instruments.491
However, other than asserting that it is a plausible argument,492
Janus fails to demonstrate that the Minnesota courts have been 
unable to identify a very small group of sex offenders with
particular histories showing that they are most likely (specifically, 
“highly likely”) to reoffend.  It is more reasonable to assume that 
Minnesota trial and appellate courts have complied with the
directive of the Minnesota Supreme Court and have identified a 
group of persons who are shown by clear and convincing evidence 
to meet the “highly likely”-to-reoffend standard, i.e., having a 
likelihood of reoffense ranging from perhaps sixty percent to 
nearly 100% (near certainty of reoffense).493
Janus’ next analytical step recognizes that persons who will 
sexually reoffend will not all do so within the first year after release.
Rather, the model supported by the literature is that, in a potential 
recidivism group, higher numbers will reoffend in the first few 
years after release, with additional but diminishing numbers of 
persons reoffending in subsequent years.494  Janus reports, for 
example, that the developers of the Minnesota Sex Offender 
Screening Tool–Revised conclude that seventy percent of sex 
on Sex Offender Recidivism, 21 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 28, 32 (1994) (stating “officially
reported numbers of sex offenses are widely recognized to be gross
underestimates”).
489. Furby, supra note 488, at 27.
490. Janus, Empirically-Based Prevention Policy, supra note 485, 1024.
491. Id. at 1096. 
492. Janus later asserts that his “plausible argument” is one that he makes 
“with some confidence.” Id. at 1098.
493. In Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 180, the Minnesota Supreme Court
interpreted the SDP law to require that the person be “highly likely” to reoffend.
The court made clear that this is a standard higher than a bare fifty-one percent 
standard, and instead corresponds to the clear and convincing evidence standard.
The court emphasized this “highly likely” element must be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 1 (2002) (specifying
clear and convincing standard of proof for commitment).
494. Janus, Empirically-Based Prevention Policy, supra note 485, at 1096, n.54.
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offenders in the highest risk group on that instrument will sexually 
reoffend within the first six years, and an additional eighteen 
percent will reoffend if the follow-up period is extended another 
fourteen years.495
Using such figures for various actuarial tools, Janus attempts to 
determine a range of average annual recidivism rates, and then 
apply such rates to the entire group of committed persons.  He 
calculates these annual recidivism rates by dividing the recidivism 
rate for each actuarial instrument by the length of the follow-up
period used to achieve that rate.496  He apparently acknowledges 
that the validity of this annualization method is not well
established, asserting only that it “seems a permissible
technique.”497  Curiously, using Janus’ method, any “annual
recidivism rate” can be decreased simply by adding more years to 
the follow-up period.498  And, again, Janus’ assumed gross
recidivism and annual recidivism rates fail to account for
unreported or unsolved acts of sexual assault.
Finally, and most fundamentally erroneous, Janus’ figures 
include the unspoken assumption that each recidivist commits only 
one sexual assault.  He calculates that between six and twenty-three
of the total of 190 committed persons will reoffend in a given 
year.499  He then asserts that this means that civil commitment 
during that year has “prevent[ed] between six and twenty-three of 
the “cleared” crimes of sexual violence.”500  This one-recidivist-
equals-one-assault assumption is obviously not true.  Janus’ own 
previous work shows that more than half of committed persons in 
Minnesota had more than one (known) victim during their most 
recent period of freedom prior to incarceration, and that more 
than one-quarter had three or more (known) victims.501  Indeed, 
the committed person Janus himself represents, Dennis Linehan, 
had at least five sexual assault victims during his last period of non-
incarceration—the violent rapes of two young women, the
495. Id. at 1096.
496. Id.
497. Id. at 1096 n. 55. 
498. As his figures illustrate, the annual recidivism rate (as he calculates it) on 
the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool–Revised is reduced from twelve 
percent to four percent simply by increasing the follow-up period from six to 
twenty years. Id. at 1096.
499. Id. at 1102 n. 82.
500. Id. at 1102.
501. Janus & Walbek, supra note 18, at 360-61.
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molestation of two young girls and the strangulation death of a 
teenage babysitter during an attempted sexual assault.502  Thus, in 
Linehan’s case, what Janus is counting as one sex offense victim to 
be avoided is actually five.  When Richard Enebak was arrested for 
his last sexual assault before his civil commitment (which left his 
victim permanently paralyzed), he had pictures of thirty-four other 
victims.503  In Enebak’s case, what Janus is counting as one sex 
offense victim to be avoided is actually thirty-five.
Not only do many committed persons have multiple victims 
when they reoffend, but often (particularly with pedophiles), the 
offender commits numerous sexual assaults against each victim.
For example, during his most-recent period of non-incarceration,
Rodger Robb molested at least three (known) adolescent boys with 
a total number of assaults ranging between approximately fifteen 
and thirty.504  In Robb’s case, therefore, what Janus is counting as 
one sexual assault to be prevented is actually between fifteen and 
thirty such assaults.
Therefore, the relevant inquiry is what amount of sexual
violence would occur absent the commitment of the group of 
persons currently committed in Minnesota.  The examples just 
given show the amount of sexual violence that a single reoffender 
may commonly inflict prior to apprehension and reincarceration.505
Janus’ equation of one recidivist with a single sexual assault,
therefore, vastly understates the amount of sexual victimization that 
is avoided by the commitment of the current Minnesota
commitment group.
In addition to his mistaken effort to quantify the numbers of 
sexual assaults avoided by civil commitment, Janus challenges the 
notion that only the “most dangerous” sex offenders are civilly 
committed.  However, the commitment standards contain two 
requirements that insure that only sufficiently dangerous persons 
502. In re Linehan (Linehan III), 544 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994),
aff’d, 557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996), vacated and remanded, 522 U.S. 1001 (1997), 
aff’d as modified, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999); In re Linehan (Linehan I), 518
N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1994).
503. Enebak v. Noot, 353 N.W.2d 544, 545-46 (Minn. 1984).
504. In re Robb, 622 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), review denied
(Minn. Apr. 17, 2001).  According to the opinion, Robb molested one boy ten to 
fifteen times and the other two boys “several” times. Id.
505. Of course, a committed person may also have only a single known sexual 
assault during his last period of nonincarceration. See, e.g., In re Givens, No. C4-02-
995, 2002 WL 31554041 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2002).  Givens murdered his 
previous rape victim. Id. at *1.
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are civilly committed.  First, as just explained, the laws require the 
person be “highly likely” to reoffend with additional sexual
offenses.  Second, both the SPP and SDP laws require that the 
person’s past and anticipated future conduct be “of such an
egregious nature that it creates a substantial likelihood of serious 
physical or mental harm being inflicted on the victims.”506  This 
does not mean that the harmful nature of the sexual assault has to 
be greater than the average sexual assault, but rather it excludes 
sexual assaults that are at the least-harmful end of the spectrum.507
Thus, the person must be highly likely to engage in seriously harmful
sexual assault.  These two requirements together identify the “most 
dangerous” sex offenders released from prison.
Janus argues there is a “wide variation in the ‘dangerousness’”
of persons committed as SPP and SDP, and he uses his own 
previous study to suggest that committed persons are not
consistently among the most dangerous sex offenders.508
Undoubtedly, committed persons will vary in the severity of their 
past offenses (some have even murdered their victims), and
similarly they may vary from just meeting the “highly likely”
standard to being virtually certain to reoffend.  Thus, even among 
the “most dangerous” there will be a range of dangerousness.
However, Janus’ previous work suggesting that some committed 
persons are not very dangerous contains obvious flaws.  Most
significant, he observes that some committed persons have “no 
prior adult sex crimes,” suggesting that persons with no history or a 
limited history of sex offenses are committed along with persons 
who have extensive sex offense histories.509  But Janus simply 
ignores the fact that many committed persons have extensive 
juvenile histories of sexual offenses that were the bases for their 
commitments,510 and that committing courts make specific findings 
506. In re Rickmyer, 519 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn. 1994) (stating harmfulness 
standard under SPP law).  The SDP law contains a standard that is essentially 
identical. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 7a (2002).
507. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has issued contradictory decisions on 
this point. Compare Robb, 622 N.W.2d at 571-72 (under SDP law, level of
harmfulness must be greater than typical sexual assault), with In re Preston, 629 
N.W.2d 104, 113 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that state supreme court has not 
required greater-than-normal harm).
508. Janus, Empirically-Based Prevention Policy, supra note 485, at 1110 (citing 
Janus & Walbek, supra note 18).
509. Janus & Walbek, supra note 18, at 371.
510. See, e.g., In re Anderson, No. C9-97-2225, 1998 WL 281914 (Minn. Ct. App. 
June 2, 1998); In re Gleason, No. C2-97-2194, 1998 WL 218223 (Minn. Ct. App. 
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of many sexual assaults that were not the subject of previous 
criminal convictions.511  Janus’ method of looking to previous sex 
offense convictions to quantify the person’s history of sexual assaults 
is wholly misleading.
Janus makes some arguments that these civil commitments are 
actually counterproductive—that they tend to increase, rather than 
decrease, the incidence of sexual assault.  He asserts, for example, 
that civil commitment creates disincentives for prisoners to
participate in sex offender treatment, due to the possibility that 
their treatment disclosures will be used to support later civil
commitment.512  Thus, he has contended, some offenders will 
decline to participate or not fully participate in prison sex offender 
treatment, and society will be less safe.  This concern is not without 
basis: in Minnesota, therapist-client privileges do not apply in civil 
commitment proceedings,513 and treatment disclosures are
sometimes used in commitment cases.514  A 1998 study group 
created by the Legislature decided not to recommend a statutory 
change prohibiting the use of prison treatment disclosures in 
sexual predator commitment cases.515  However, even if the
Legislature were to determine the detriment from such use
outweighed the public benefit, the remedy would be to bar
consideration of the treatment disclosures, not abandon civil
commitment.
The questions Janus asks—whether public monies spent on 
civil commitment of sexual predators are well spent and whether 
the money spent on that program could be more productively 
spent elsewhere—deserve to be asked, and serious and unbiased 
research efforts to help provide answers to those questions are 
warranted.  Nevertheless, Janus’ assertion that the “evidence seems 
fairly clear that a net prevention of sexual violence might well 
result from the total elimination of sex offender commitments” and 
a transfer of those funds to other violence prevention efforts516 is a 
dramatic overstatement.  For the reasons explained above (among 
May 5, 1998).
511. See, e.g., In re Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260, 263-64 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), 
review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2002).
512. Janus, Empirically-Based Prevention Policy, supra note 485, at 1130.
513. MINN. STAT. § 253B.23, subd. 4 (2002); In re Robb, 622 N.W.2d 564, 575-
76 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2001).
514. DOC CIV. COMMIT. STUDY, supra note 42, at 27-28.
515. Id. at 28.
516. Janus, Empirically-Based Prevention Policy, supra note 485, at 1131-32.
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others), Janus’ writings should be regarded only as raising
important questions, not answering them.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Is the government constitutionally helpless to protect the
public through civil commitment when a still-dangerous sex
offender—one who has a mental disorder that results in serious 
difficulty controlling behavior—reaches a mandatory prison release 
date?  The Supreme Court has said no.  Should government 
decline to act in such cases because commitment is costly, or for 
the other reasons advanced by commitment opponents?  The 
Minnesota Legislature and many other legislatures have answered 
no.
Since 1989 there have been many significant developments in 
Minnesota and elsewhere involving the sentencing, treatment,
correctional supervision and civil commitment of persons who 
commit sex offenses.  Of these efforts, it is civil commitment that 
began this period in greatest doubt as to its constitutionality and 
utility.  But much has been resolved over this period, judicially, 
legislatively and administratively.  The constitutionality of these 
laws has been affirmed and judicial guidance has been provided for 
their application.  Minnesota developed a specialized treatment 
program to address the unique problems of this difficult-to-treat
group.  Laws have been changed to make greater use of the 
criminal system to provide public protection, and state agencies 
have worked to make the corrections and human services systems 
mesh more effectively to provide treatment and to minimize the 
cost and period of necessary confinement.
Because of these efforts, countless children will escape the 
long-term harm of sexual molestation.  Innumerable women will 
not have to personally experience the trauma of rape.  We cannot 
know, of course, who most of these potential victims are.  We need 
only look at the stories of the committed persons’ past victims to 
see a vivid picture of what bas been prevented.
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